Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established after India’s 1974 nuclear tests. Only signatories of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) can fulfill the criteria for NSG membership. India is not a signatory of NPT. India, however, is getting support from the US for entry into the NSG. Since Pakistan is a nuclear power and a non-NPT signatory so, it also applied for membership of the NSG along with India in 2016. Pakistan took the stance of criteria-based membership - entry either for all or none. China opposed membership of India into the group based on the NPT signatory grounds. Thus, India’s membership was vetoed. This article analyzes NSG’s membership case of India and Pakistan. It further discusses the nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan. In India’s membership case, it highlights the role of the US and Grossi’s proposal. In Pakistan’s membership case, it discusses China’s role briefly.
NSG, NPT, India, Pakistan, US, China
In recent times, the debate of extending membership to the non-Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories to Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has increased. India and Pakistan, both nuclear states and non-signatories of NPT, applied for the NSG membership in 2016. India’s membership in the group has been supported by the US. However, it is interesting to observe that despite the fact that NSG was founded after India’s 1974 nuclear test ‘Smiling Buddha’. India is getting favors out of the group members owing to the US pressure. Qutab (2016) argues in this regard that NSG’s creation is the direct response to India’s diversion from a peaceful program to conduct a nuclear test. Moreover, Anthony et al., (2007) write in this context that NSG was created after three years of discussion among countries that were nuclear suppliers including the US and the UK. It was created to prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms to countries other than the recognized in NPT framework i.e. the USA, Russia (former USSR), UK, France and China. They additionally said that India’s nuclear explosion prompted the USA and the UK to strengthen nuclear weapons’ non-proliferation regime beyond the scope of NPT. Chekov et al., (2018) argue that all the current members of NSG are NPT signatories and it is mandatory that all the NSG members should also sign NPT. The group of 48 countries, NSG is a vital part of nuclear weapons export controls. With the aim of limiting the proliferation of nuclear arms by monitoring dual-use nuclear technologies and export limitations, NSG supervises the transfer of nuclear technology between states transparently. Although, there is no mechanism for legal enforcement in NSG yet it keeps states accountable for nuclear proliferation (Chekov et al., 2018).
With the debate of extending membership to non-NPT signatories, this article aims to explore India and Pakistan’s case of NSG membership. Both being the nuclear powers and non-NPT signatories should receive the same treatment. However, owing to the US pressure and influence in the group, India is currying favours with different member states of the NSG. Pakistan, however, is not being treated on the equal grounds. Keeping this debate in context; this article will highlight the case of NSG membership of India and Pakistan. Firstly, the foundation and origin of Nuclear Suppliers Group will be discussed along with its membership criteria.
Secondly, the nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan will be analyzed. Thirdly, it will elaborate on the membership case of India and Pakistan respectively. It will argue that why NSG is ready to let go of its rule of NPT signatory to extend membership to India only but not to Pakistan. The role of the US in favor of India’s membership will also be discussed. Lastly, the Case of Pakistan will be discussed in the light of the criteria-based position maintained by Pakistan to NSG membership. China’s role will also be discussed with regard to NSG membership to non-NPT signatories.
The Foundation and Origin of Nuclear Suppliers Group
India’s 1974 nuclear test prompted seven countries including the USA, the UK, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Union, France, and Japan to coordinate the control of their nuclear exports. The US and Canada supplied the reactor which India used to produce plutonium. They supplied the reactor with the assumption that India would use it for peaceful civilian purposes. However, with its nuclear test, India deviated from its peaceful nuclear program for civilian purposes to a nuclear weapons program. Since India was not an NPT signatory, so it described its nuclear test as a peaceful nuclear explosion code-named as ‘Smiling Buddha’. Nevertheless, “the country (India) was suspected of maintaining a nuclear weapons program (Thränert & Bieri, 2013).”
The NSG formally came into existence in late 1974. The guidelines adopted in the 1970s influenced the export policies of the members in the 1980s as well. However, the events in the Gulf region in the early 1990s created an urge to revive the cooperation among the NSG members (Anthony et al., 2007). In 1992, NSG held a plenary meeting in Warsaw, Poland. It adopted a principle with the consensus of all members that it would not contribute directly or indirectly to the nuclear weapons’ proliferation and it also ensured that the non-proliferation objectives would not be compromised because of the commercial competition among the members of the NSG (Qutab, 2016).
Thränert and Bieri (2013) argue that the NSG members have regarded the non-proliferation norm until now. Nevertheless, this principle has been challenged with two recent developments. Firstly, more states have gained access to nuclear technologies which they can use to produce nuclear weapons. Secondly, arms extend membership, NSG must reach a decision. The second development talks about extending membership to the non-NPT signatories. However, a country’s bid for NSG membership depends on the approval of five criteria:
1. A country’s capability to supply listed goods according to the guidelines of NSG.
2. Its willingness to implement guidelines of NSG.
3. A national export control regime’s existence and implementation according to the rules of NSG. It is also legally binding.
4. NPT membership (signatory) along with the complete enforcement of the NPT rules.
5. Its willingness to back the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Although it is essential to maintain all the criteria, however, number 4 is essential to meet to get entry into the group. Both South Asian neighboring countries Pakistan and India are non-signatories of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.
An Analysis of India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrines
Nuclear Doctrine is the strategy adopted by a state’s leadership regarding employment and deployment of nuclear forces at the time of crisis. The primary objective of nuclear doctrine is to provide institutional, infrastructural and conceptual mechanisms of nuclear arms. There are two basic types of nuclear doctrines: a defensive nuclear doctrine which is non-aggressive in nature while the second one offensive nuclear doctrine which offensive in nature. A doctrine outlines policies and principles, as a guideline for the decision and policy makers, regarding the development, employment and nuclear forces’ deployment (Khalid, 2012). Keeping their peculiar and unique security environment in mind, countries strategize their own (nuclear) doctrines. Nuclear principles and beliefs are fickle. With the change in leadership, doctrines can be reexamined and revisited, if the necessity arises (Iqbal, 2016).
Iqbal (2016) while analyzing the nuclear doctrines of Pakistan and India argues that antagonism between Pakistan and India characterizes the South Asian culture. Consequently, nuclearization, wars, skirmishes, arms buildup and arms race perpetually present insecurity in the region. However, nuclearization has proved to be a preventive instrument between the two neighboring countries.
Pakistan and India use the clichéd term ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ as their nuclear doctrines. However, the nuclear arms race between both countries tells a different tale.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine
According to Khalid (2012), India’s nuclear doctrine has evolved in two phases. The first phase is based on China's dimension which persisted from 1947-1974. The second phase is based on the Pakistan dimension which persists from 1974 to the present. India’s rationale behind its nuclear program is China’s nuclear explosion in 1964. However, nuclear pursuits of India started in the 1950s way before China’s nuclearization. Chinese nuclear tests, nevertheless, provided an impetus to India’s nuclear drive (Iqbal, 2016). Furthermore, Khalid (2012) argues that the nuclear doctrine of India is not a circumstantial product and it has evolved within the frame of regional politics. There has been an Indian security policy since the time of Nehru. The nuclear weapons’ program in India can be found since its independence in 1947.
In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear tests. India declared it a ‘peaceful nuclear test’. It was also claimed that India will no longer develop further nuclear weapons. There was no clear nuclear doctrine after the nuclear explosion of 1974. The Indian nuclear doctrine was started in 1998 (Khalid, 2012). India adopted the no-first-use doctrine after the 1998 nuclear explosions. All subsequent Indian governments have echoed this pledge and followed the doctrine (Menon, 2016). A year after conducting a nuclear test in 1998, India made an announcement of its Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) in 1999. In 2003, another doctrine policy was issued. According to Draft Nuclear Doctrine, the main features of the nuclear doctrine of India are:
· Credible Minimum Deterrence
· The policy of ‘No-first-use’ (Note: India has clued to shift from this policy in 2019)
· Maintenance of sufficient nuclear forces who will be operationally prepared to employ deployment in a small span of time
· Command authority of nuclear weapons’ release will vest with Indian Prime Minister or the successor designated
· Maintenance of conventional military capabilities
· Triad (Land, Sea, and air) responsive nuclear forces
· No restraint acceptance on R & D capability and even if India signs CTBT in the future, it will conduct a sub-critical nuclear test
· No nuclear use against states which possess no nuclear weapons except for the states aligned to states with nuclear weapons
· Maintenance on control of missile exports and technologies related to nuclear weapons (2003)
· Participation in Negotiations for Treaty on Fissile Material Cut Off (2003)
· Compliance with the cessation of nuclear tests (2003) (Iqbal, 2016)
During its 2014 election manifesto, Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) promised to study the nuclear doctrine of India in detail and update it in order to make it more relevant to current time challenges. However, the party assured of maintenance of the no-first-use Policy (Sidhu, 2014). In 2017, a new war-fighting doctrine, “The Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces 2017,” was released by the Indian Armed Forces. It emphasized the need for improved capabilities in cyberspace and space along with stressing the importance of operations conducted to combat cross-border terrorism (the author cites India’s claim of surgical strike inside Pakistan in 2016). On contrary to the old nuclear doctrine of India, its new doctrine called to maintain “credible deterrence” instead of “minimum credible deterrence” which insinuates shift in India’s nuclear posture. This shift in the doctrine will have a worse impact on Indian foreign policy. Moreover, China will get another reason to block India’s entry into the NSG because of this new doctrine. The new doctrine, however, restated India’s no-first-use nuclear policy (Rajeev, 2017).
Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine
According to Krepon (2013), Pakistan does not provide any clear nuclear doctrine, unlike its neighboring rival India who has declared its nuclear doctrine publicly. However, four pillars seem to be of the utmost importance among Pakistani civilian and military officials. The following are the four pillars of the nuclear doctrine of Pakistan:
· Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is centered on India.
· Its aim is to maintain ‘Minimum Credible deterrence’.
· A dynamic threat environment would determine the requirements of credible minimum deterrence. It is not fixed.
· Pakistan adheres to its first use policy because of given advantages of the Indian military conventionally.
The primary policy goal of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is aimed at deterring Indian nuclear as well as conventional aggression. The secondary goal is to deny victory to Indian in an event of war, in case of deterrence failure. Pakistan has never declared no-first-use policy which means in an event of war, Pakistan keeps the option of using nuclear weapons first open. This option is constant in Pakistan’s nuclear policy because India has an unfavorable advantage owing to its conventional weapons asymmetry with Pakistan (Tasleem, 2016). Pakistan is suspicious of India’s no-first-use Policy and considers it a political gimmick to gain higher moral ground. For Pakistan, it does not have any credence (Iqbal, 2016). Hence, in order to deter any attack on its territory, Pakistan keeps its first-use policy constant. Both the policy and academic communities are in favor of Pakistan’s retaining the first-use-policy. However, the security analysts and scholars’ have also recognized the challenges which the first use policy entails. Such a policy requires good military intelligence, an effective warning system and a high degree of efficiency in maintaining nuclear weapons (Tasleem, 2016).
The principle option for Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’. This principle implies that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is centered towards its arch-rival India (Khalid, 2012). While referring to this principle Iqbal (2016) argues that the sole aim of nuclear doctrine is deterrence. Pakistan’s approach to deterrence is realistic and rational which discards any impression of arms race with its arch-rival India.
Although there is no officially declared nuclear doctrine of Pakistan the salient features of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine can be summarized as follows:
· Pakistan maintains a minimum credible deterrence.
· Pakistan will not engage in the arms race with India.
· Pakistan will support non-discriminatory international arms control regimes.
· Pakistan will participate in negotiations of the Fissile Material Test.
· Pakistan will abstain from tests of nuclear arms.
· Pakistan through legal and administrative mechanisms strengthens existing controls on nuclear technology exports.
From existing literature on the nuclear program of Pakistan, one can identify that the program aims to fill various economic and political roles. In recent times, there have been references made to the probability of using nuclear arms for emerging threats from states other than India. However, there is no such evidence at this point in time that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has evolved to comprise threats other than that of India (Tasleem, 2016).
India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Membership Case
“We got the waiver in 2008 but we are pursuing to become a member of NSG because there is a difference between sitting inside the room and sitting outside it. We are outside the room despite the waiver we got. When you are in, you are a part of the decision making process.”
(Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj)
Jung (2017) argues that India has been building its international legitimacy for its nuclear weapons recognition and status as a nuclear state since the early 2000s. India successfully got documented its vivid record on the non-proliferation of nuclear technology along with gaining an NSG waiver during the nuclear deal with the US in 2008. It also gained the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime which is India-specific. Qutab (2016) in this context argues that NSG sacrificed its principle of non-proliferation to grant a country-specific and unprecedented waiver to the Indian state to have co-operated with the NSG regime. He argues that it was done because of the US pressure within the group. It is transparent from this move that the US wants to use India as a counter-weight to China. Akram (2016) supports Qutab’s argument and says that the US offered an exception to India for civilian nuclear cooperation because the US wants to secure its strategic support with India against China within the region of South Asia.
Both Pakistan and India simultaneously applied for NSG membership in the year 2016. In India’s case, it, so far, does not meet the mandatory conditions of NSG membership acceptance. India is neither signatory of NPT nor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) signed in 1996. It does not comply with comprehensive agreements of IAEA on safeguards. It is noteworthy here that if India signs these agreements, it will have to give up its nuclear arms program. India considers nuclear arms its essential national security element. It seems unlikely that India will ever disarm itself and sign these agreements (Chekov et al., 2018). However, Chekov et al., (2018) further argue that in spite of all these, India left no stone unturned to gain NSG membership. It was because of its unrelenting efforts it was granted a waiver to the group in 2008. Jung (2017) claims that India was able to be part of international nuclear commerce because of this waiver. Additionally, it developed a political consensus among the members of NSG which separated India from other non-NPT nuclear powers such as Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Chekov et al., (2018) support Jung’s claim and argue that India was able to purchase nuclear fissile materials abroad after the waiver. It was, however, not allowed to reprocess ENR technologies, export any materials and import enrichments. Therefore, India kept insisting on gaining full membership in the group. Jaspal (2016) in this regard argues that for the Modi Government, the membership of NSG seems to be the most critical foreign policy priority.
Sacrifice in Principle to grant exemption and NSG membership to India
Mustafa (2017) points out in his paper, “NSG Membership Debate: Recent Development” that major powers are supportive of India’s NSG membership and asserting pressure on the group members along with coming up with proposals like Grossi’s proposal to grant membership to India. This, according to Mustafa, undermines the spirit of the international non-proliferation nuclear regime. Both Qutab (2016) and Akram (2016) have argued that it is well-established fact that India is currying favor with NSG members because of the US pressure. Jaspal (2016) also argues that India has been enjoying special treatment in NSG because of its strategic partnership with the US.
Furthermore, Qutab (2016) added that even before the finalization of the NSG exemptions to India, Russia (an old ally of India) and France had started negotiating with India. It resulted because of the political arm-twisting of the opposing states rather than a conscious decision. In order to secure nuclear material and technology from abroad, India was able to conclude more than a dozen nuclear deals from 2008 to 2016 because of the NSG waiver.
Grossi Proposal for Membership to Non-NPT signatories into NSG
In 2016, former Chairperson of NSG Ambassador Rafael Mariano Grossi gave his proposal to pave the way for non-NPT signatories into NSG. Indian Media consider Ambassador Grossi as ‘Points person for India’ (Chaudhury, 2018). Mustafa (2017), in this regard, argues that Gross’ proposal meant to pave the way for India. He particularly used the phrase that ‘Grossi was tasked’ to build a consensus among members of the group for India’s membership into NSG. In December 2016, Grossi came up with his proposal for Non-NPT members’ entry called “Exchange of Notes” which is also called Grossi Formula or Grossi Proposal. This formula outlines nine criteria for Non-NPT signatory states for their entry into NSG. The formula asks for the separation of non-civilian nuclear facilities from civilian nuclear facilities with an IAEA declaration that must identify all non-civilian and civilian facilities. The IAEA should determine that facilities are safeguarded. Moreover, the formula also wanted to have the commitment of not conducting of nuclear arms test. Mustafa (2016) cites Former Pakistani Ambassador Zamir Akram and argues that Grossi violated the mandate of devising an equitable membership for non-NPT signatory states. Instead, the formula was aimed at facilitating selected countries, mainly India.
US Role in Case of NSG Membership
Paracha (2016) criticizes the US for adopting a derogatory approach towards smaller states. She argues that such an approach of the superpower is transparent in two ways: firstly, the US partially demands that Pakistan should improve its non-proliferation credentials in order to be considered for entry into the NSG. Secondly, the way in which the US exerts pressure on smaller states for winning India membership into the group is discriminatory. Qutab (2016) in this context argues that in the South Asian region, the US incessantly pushes inconsistent policies. On one hand, the US wants to have a nuclear restraint and progressive dialogue between Pakistan and India. On the other hand, the obvious ambitions which the US pursues breed instability and arms race within the region. This duplicity speaks volumes of the US’ approach regarding NSG membership to non-NPT signatories.
NSG’s Point of View regarding Membership to India
Thränert and Bieri (2013) point out that Indian membership into the NSG would be advantageous for the group in the sense that India would be an addition to the regime’s important potential exporters. Because India is considered as a potential market for their goods, thus, four nuclear arms state the USA, Russia, France and the UK, support Indian membership. Moreover, these nuclear states have an “economic interest in maintaining a flourishing nuclear trade with the country.” However, various members of NSG are suspicious of Indian membership because they believe it would disentangle NSG membership from NPT. They argue that India cannot join NPT until it relinquishes its nuclear arms which would be unrealistic to think of (Thränert & Bieri, 2013).
Pakistan’s case of Nuclear Suppliers Group Membership
“Regarding NSG, Pakistan's principle position is that the question on NSG membership must be dealt with in a single, uniform, non-discriminatory and criteria-based approach, which is essential for maintaining strategic stability in South Asia. NSG participating governments acknowledged the merits of adopting the criteria-based approach rather than a country-specific exemption. This stand resonated with Pakistan's position. However, Pakistan firmly believes that it has credentials and merit to become a member of NSG. Therefore, we will continue our efforts to seek NSG membership.”
(Former Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nafees Zakaria)
According to a Congressional Research Service report, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons” published on August 01, 2016, Pakistan approximately possesses 110 -130 nuclear warheads. The report suspects that the number of nuclear warheads could be more. However, it highlights that Pakistan has taken steps to augment International confidence in its nuclear arms’ security. The report also mentions Pakistan’s civilian nuclear program and argues that Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 sales to Pakistan by China are not according to NSG guidelines. China made these civilian nuclear sales to Pakistan in response to Indo-US peaceful civil nuclear deal in 2008. Pakistan plans to increase nuclear energy from 400 MWe (by 2016) to 8800 MWe by 2030 and 40,000 MWe by 2050, the report adds.
It is pertinent to note here that the report clearly mentions Pakistan’s both civilian and military nuclear programs separately. However, Pakistan has been treated unfairly because of its alleged mixture of civil-military nuclear programs. Mustafa (2017) argues that Pakistan has always shown interest in using nuclear technology for the purpose of peaceful energy. He also argues that the civilian nuclear program of Pakistan is already disentangled from its military nuclear program and there is no intention of mixing them both. He further adds that despite the improved credentials in Pakistan’s nuclear front; it is treated differently by the international community. Grossi’s formula is meant that Pakistan should be kept out of the NSG group. India gets entry once then Pakistan’s entry would be in jeopardy (Mustafa, 2017). Qutab (2016) also made a similar argument. He argued that Pakistan’s entry would surely be blocked if India is granted entry before Pakistan because NSG entry is based on unanimous consensus among all the members. Chekov et al., (2018) support this view and argue that with respect to their national securities, Pakistan and India traditionally consider each other threats. Hence, India’s acceptance without Pakistan would imperil Pakistan’s entry into the group. Given the group’s consensus-based process, India (after membership) would be in a position to veto Pakistan’s bid legally into the group. Because of such apprehensions, Pakistan asks for a criterion-based membership entry into the NSG group.
Pakistan’s Position of Criteria-based entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group
On May 18, 2016, Pakistan applied for membership in NSG formally. Both India and the US were surprised by Pakistan’s such move. Soon after applying formally, Pakistan started urging with states supportive of its position for their backing in its bid to gain entry into the group. Pakistan also approached the US in this context. However, the US asked Pakistan to put its membership case before all the members of the group rather than lobbying for the individual endorsement from members of the NSG. Such remarks from the US make its tilt towards New Delhi apparent (Jaspal, 2016).
According to Paracha (2016), Pakistan advocates criterion-based entry into the NSG for non-NPT states. Given the economic and military asymmetry of India and Pakistan, the criterion-based approach is the best bet for Pakistan. In this context, Jaspal (2016) adds that Pakistan maintains the stance of non-biased criteria for NSG membership to nonsignatories of NPT states. Jung (2017) highlights that Pakistan has two particular demands regarding NSG membership, the first demand is based on none-or-all principle i.e. consideration for all or none non-NPT signatories’ membership and the second demand is a non-discriminatory process for membership process for all applicants.
Qutab (2016) argues that criterion-based position of Pakistan is fundamentally based on two arguments:
1. Criteria-based entry would maintain NSG’s credibility as an institution of non-proliferation. It would provide NSG an opportunity to assimilate non-NPT signatories into the fold of the non-proliferation system. Here, Pakistan maintains that this criterion should be applicable to both India and Pakistan.
2. Criteria-based entry will maintain strategic stability in the region of South Asian. Pakistan’s policymakers consider that it will de-hyphenate both nuclear states and India would be persuaded to engage with Pakistan on Confidence Building Measures (CBM).
Role of China in NSG Membership to India and Pakistan
China has adopted a principled stance in the context of NSG membership. China wants the extension of membership only to NPT signatories. Both India and the US consider this a foremost impediment to Indian membership in the group. All the NSG members, both nuclear and non-nuclear states, are the signatories of NPT. However, India has not yet signed the treaty. Thus, its entry was blocked by twelve members including China, Turkey, South Africa, Austria etc. in the 2016 NSG Seoul plenary meeting (Jaspal, 2016).
Jung (2017) argues that China along with other states blocked India’s entry into the group. However, she considers Pakistan’s application along with the Chinese strong opposition created hindrances for India. She further points out that because of its alleged proliferation history, the membership case of Pakistan was complicated. Pakistan’s application was more of a strategy to create the hindrance for India’s NSG membership than to get Nuclear Suppliers Groups’ entry.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was founded in late 1974 after India’s nuclear tests earlier that year. The group was the immediate reaction to India’s diversion from a peaceful civilian nuclear program to the military one. Countries that had apprehensions against India’s nuclear explosion gathered in London (initially NSG was referred to as London Group) and established the group with the objective to control nuclear exports. The initial guidelines of the group influenced the late 1970s and 1980s policies. Gulf War in the 1990s compelled the group to revive the cooperation which ensured the non-proliferation objectives. However, the group extended the waiver to India in 2008 which encouraged India to apply for full membership of the group in 2016. India’s bid was supported by the US because of India’s strategic influence to counter-weight China in the region. China responded not only with the blockage of Indian membership but also presumably urged Pakistan to make its bid for membership into the group too along with India. Nuclear Suppliers Group’s membership is based on the NPT-signatory. All the current 48 members are also NPT signatories. Both India and Pakistan are non-NPT signatories. Therefore, their entry into the group should be treated equally. Grossi’s formula, which was meant to pave the way for India’s membership, vividly shows discrimination against Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear program runs under strong measures and security guidelines. It is also claimed by the experts that Pakistan has separated its civilian and military nuclear programs. Despite these assurances, Pakistan’s demand for a criteria-based approach is being ignored. In case, India is given NSG membership before Pakistan, it will not only endanger Pakistan’s bid into the group but will also escalate instability in the South Asian region. Therefore, NSG membership to non-signatories of NPT should be based on the criteria of impartiality. It must follow the principle of none-or-all for non-NPT signatories as demanded by Pakistan.