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The Evolution of Federalism in Pakistan: Challenges and Prospects Post-18th Amendment

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**Keywords:** Federalism, 18th Amendment, Devolution, Provincial Autonomy, Intergovernmental Relations, Pakistan Constitution, Governance

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## Title

### The Evolution of Federalism in Pakistan: Challenges and Prospects Post-18th Amendment

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#### Abstract

*The concept of federalism in Pakistan has changed considerably since 1947, given the relevance of the issue between the tension among democratization, central authority, and provincial autonomy. However, the 2010 18th Constitutional Amendment was instrumental in that the power was taken away from the central government to the provinces. This research focuses on the history of federalism in Pakistan, the justification of the 18th Amendment, and its effect on governance, democracy, and intergovernmental relations. While the Amendment was celebrated as a step forward in the building of provincial autonomy and participatory democracy, its execution has been hindered by institutional, political, and administrative hindrances. This paper investigates whether the 18th Amendment has been a step for or against federalism. It also looks at what the future of cooperative federalism will be, taking present discussions in the areas of fiscal control, national integration, and political centralization.*

#### Keywords:

[Federalism](#), [18th Amendment](#), [Devolution](#), [Provincial Autonomy](#), [Intergovernmental Relations](#), [Pakistan Constitution](#), [Governance](#)

#### Introduction

Specifically, federalism is a system that balances federalism of rule and self-rule with central and subnational units. One of the constitutional mechanisms of federalism in such ethnically and linguistically mixed countries like Pakistan is not only the need to deal with diversity but also a feeling of unity, and a good, prosperous life for all (Jaffrelot et al., 2024). The history of the Federal Structure of Pakistan has dealt with a historical legacy, historical centralization, military interventions, and rising democratic trends throughout its history since its

birth in 1947. One of the most historic milestones in the federal evolution of Pakistan is the 18th Constitutional Amendment passed in 2010, which began a complete reversal in the balance of the federal and provincial power.

This model was bequeathed to Pakistan upon its independence from a centralist inherited model of British India. The country was to be a federal parliamentary democracy under which the Constitution of 1973 states, but military regimes that came after concentrated it in the center. Before the 18th Amendment, there was planning on the central




lines, federal control over more significant things like schools, health, and natural resources, and limited institutional arrangements for provincial autonomy were invisible (Khatoon, 2023a). Nevertheless, centralization led to the formation of countless complaints from the provinces and smaller federating units, as little federating units like Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had been closely attached to ethnic identity and economic marginalization.

The political process leading up to the 18th Amendment was consensual in nature, and there

was a spirit of the 1973 Constitution restored. It devolved 17 ministries and eliminated the Concurrent Legislative List that had given subjects to the center and provinces before. Provincialism also totally subordinated the training of charity for the senses and the soul (Naqvi et al., 2025). Doing so also cemented the Council of Common Interests (CCI), a constitutional institution for settling disputes among the federal provinces. The Amendment also did not further take away presidential powers previously introduced during military regimes.

Figure 1



When the 18th Amendment was passed, the democratic breakthrough was celebrated widely. Additionally, it fulfilled long-standing provincial demands for addressing issues by curtailing the distance between service and people with the aim of projecting participatory governance (Shehzad & Afridi, n.d.). It also marked the break from Pakistan's standard autocratic procedure to a more unified and decentralized form of federalism.

However, the innovation challenges of the 18th Amendment era have become apparent. As provinces have acquired constitutional power, they have less often been able to exercise the powers devolved to them (Mukhtar, 2023). Most of the time, there has been bureaucratic inertia, insufficient coordination between federal and provincial agencies, and inadequate fiscal resources that interfere with good governance. However, in addition, there have been interprovincial unevennesses and hostility between the Federal

government and the opposition government that have been primarily potent.

Another area of concern is a federal government that lacks a clear role in issues of national importance, where provinces continue to have the lead, like higher education or national health policy. Concurrent List abolition resulted in ambiguities regarding responsibilities, centers of responsibilities, jurisdictional conflict, and confusion in the delivery of services. Fiscal federalism has also remained a highly controversial matter. However, provinces have been complaining about federal encroachment and conditional grants that undermine the autonomy process through the mechanism of the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award.

It has also played a role in the evolution of federalism post-18th Amendment under the influence of political dynamics (Ullah, 2024). In those cases when the provincial government is not from the same political party as the federal

government, the federal government has attempted to gain control of devolved subjects. It has further increased the sentiments that Pakistan's federalism is still dependent on political expediency and still lacks institutionalization through normative and practical institutionalization.

The role of the CCI is also under fire, and so is the Judiciary. However, both institutions have had great difficulty maintaining a consistent, impartial role of mediator between disputants and have had to protect the federal principles. In some such cases, CCI meetings have been forced to wait, or trust between the provinces has eroded in the process, and sometimes, implemented (in case of non-delayed CCI meetings) its decisions.

The 18th Amendment is a landmark of Pakistan's constitutional history to the extent that the more. It further provided a platform for the more balanced structure of the federal government and the commencement of the road towards participatory democracy (Ahmad et al., 2023). In addition, it also invigorated a national debate on whether decentralization, provincial empowerment, and local government can produce developmental outcomes. Institutional reform, administrative capacity building, and political ripeness, if not critical, are still essential to bring to their full potential, for this body to achieve.

The role of this paper is to explore the development of federalism in Pakistan, especially after the 18th Amendment, and to make Pakistan a better federal system. It examines the Amendment's effect on federal workings, describes how it was implemented, and promises of cooperative federalism in the future (Kakar, 2024). The analysis of these historical patterns, political behavior, institutional response, and governance outcome has been shown in this study to inform how to create a comprehensive understanding of federalism in Pakistan.

## Literature Review

Ultimately, by the 21st century, the discussion on federalism in Pakistan had gone on an entirely new course, reflecting the country's heavily inclined cultural and political landscape, constitutional developments, and center-province chief minister relations. The subject has been treated legally, historically, politically, and administratively, and has focused primarily on the centralization of power,

the roles of the military regimes, and provincial autonomy (Khatoun, 2023). Contemporary literature has been in view on the subject matter of the 18th constitutional amendment, and it seems to be one of the significant reforms in the process of Pakistan towards genuine federalism.

The central theme of the early literature on federalism in Pakistan is the historical roots of centralization. Scholars argued that the colonial administrative model, which did not fit the federal system, was Pakistan's heir. For instance, the One Unit policy from 1955 to 1970 aimed at bringing together Provinces in a single administrative unit by way of preempting marginalization of local ethnic identities and focusing the center of power (Anwar et al., 2023). As widely criticized in the literature, this 'move' is frequently seen as a symptom that ultimately led to East Pakistan's (now Bangladesh's) death and highlights the risks involved in dismissing provincial grievances.

In 1973, when the 1973 Constitution was adopted, scholars saw the progressive provisions for the sharing of legislative powers between the federal, provincial, and concurrent lists. Yet in the sustained suspension of the Constitution during military rule, particularly of Generals Zia-ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf, central dominance was consolidated. It was observed that the federal government, in the face of provincial autonomy, bypassed provincial autonomy through presidential ordinances, manipulated constitutional provisions, retained control over the most crucial policy areas through the concurrent list orders, and federal ministries.

Thus, the 18th Amendment is regarded by the academic literature as a significant remedial measure. It unmade the several amendments introduced in the authoritarian regimes, and it reinstated the parliamentary and federal character in the Constitution (Faisal et al., 2024). The Legal scholars have studied structural changes to the Amendment, namely the elimination of the concurrent list, an enhancement in the Council of Common Interests (CCI) role, and the devolution of ministries. What such reforms apparently did, at least, as this study contends that they did was not merely to reassert significant provincial control over such affairs as an elaborated political economy but to appear to breathe new life into democratic federalism.

There has been much attention from political scientists on the implications the 18th Amendment had for power sharing, party politics, and intergovernmental relations. Several studies are narrowed down to how the Amendment altered the political landscape, which left federal and provincial governments to go further and through dialogue or else (Khan et al., 2024). The granting of this concession to demand autonomy was long overdue, as the demand enjoys historic standing in provinces such as Sindh and Baluchistan. Nevertheless, some argue that the cooperation between the former is mutually beneficial, and given the circumstance of office holding with different parties, political competition among federal and provincial governments has increased periodic tensions and policy deadlocks.

Criticism has been prescribed over the literature on the administrative and policy issues of implementation of the 18th Amendment. Indeed, rather than excluding the central government from the political process, many new functions were simply too complex to be devolved well to the provincial governments that assumed formal ownership under the new arrangements. The post-devolution areas of health, education, and environment failed to plan adequately, lacked coordination, or did not have enough human resources, consequently leading to uneven service delivery. In addition, the existence of federal funding controls and vertical programs has fueled fears of back-door centralization as well (Waseem, 2024).

A key area of analysis is still any analysis of fiscal federalism. Studies highlight the significance of the National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, a prerequisite for provinces to perform their functions. Nevertheless, budgetary autonomy is hamstrung by the fact that the latest NFC Award could not kick off until it did, so rising federal expenditure and debt servicing obligations cannot be ignored. Also, literature supports the role of conditional grants and federal interventions, since that contradicts the spirit of devolution.

In addition, the literature has another important theme about institutions such as the judiciary and the CCI. Despite this, the CCI has been given teeth through the 18th Amendment in Pakistan, but the research shows that it is not always up to its purpose, as its meetings are infrequent, political interference,

and weak enforcement (Aliya & Qazi, 2024). The history of federalism is also mixed in its record when dealing with federalism-related cases, leading to condemnation of the agency's practices for, among other things, granting preferential treatment to executive convenience over constitutional clarity.

These few studies have attracted interest in new areas – digital governance, the local government system, and the role of civil society in the practice development of the Federation. They argue that provincial autonomy will be of no benefit to the periphery as long as strong local governments are not achieved. It (a 'three-tier federalism' in which the local governments are the essential actors in Pakistan's federal structure) is supported by these scholars.

The literature on federalism in Pakistan can thus be summarized as a system on a moving platform that has seen significant reforms through constitutional reforms that have not yet resulted in bringing the structural deficiencies that have plagued the system, mainly due to the absence of democracy since 1958. It was accepted that the 18th Amendment was an achievement in strengthening the Federation, and to succeed, it requires political will, institutional growth, and coordination amongst government levels of governance. Future research continues to make requests that the Amendment should be evaluated not only according to the provisions of its legislation but also concerning its effect on governance, equity, and national unity.

### Research Question

The 18th Constitutional Amendment evolved federalism in Pakistan. How much did it alleviate or neglect the structural, political, and fiscal problems of the Center/Province?

Critical appraisal of the role of the 18th Amendment in Pakistan's federation is the question of this research (Hanif & Hanif, 2023). This paper addresses the effects of the program in ensuring the respective concentration of powers of the federal and provincial governments, the self-reliance of provincial agencies and the federal and provincial governments, the self-reliance of provincial agencies and the federal and provincial governments whilst trying to maintain one over the other, these and provincial agencies and the federal and provincial governments.

Again, the question seeks to determine if the Amendment meant only that responsibilities have been shifted in paper or has effected a change in governance, public service delivery, and democratic participation at the provincial level. It looks at what broader political context affects policy outcomes in the devolution of powers, including the effect of partisan competition, civil-military relationships, and bureaucratic inertia.

Additionally, the question probes matter involving the devolution process's consequences regarding national cohesion, inequality between provinces, and identity politics, particularly for geographically peripheral provinces. It thus links constitutional reform to the need for and prospects of practical governance and future prospects of off-collaboration of federalism.

The objective of this research is to learn the good and bad aspects of the 18th Amendment and the events leading up to higher degrees of incorporation, partaking in, and rootedness in federal Pakistan, or perhaps the maintenance of ongoing centrist pervasions and institutional deficiency.

### Research Objectives

He traced the historical evolution of federalism in Pakistan with a special reference to the phases of centralization and decentralization from independence to the present.

1. To evaluate the results of the constitutional Amendment's 18th Amendment, in particular, the removal from the concurrent list and the freeing of ministries and companies, along with the redefinition of the legislative and executive responsibilities.
2. By using the cases of Pakistan and Turkey, this paper tries to assess the political and administrative challenges associated with the 18th Amendment as far as its implementation concerning institutional capacity, intergovernmental coordination, constraints, and political resistance is concerned.
3. This will also aid in checking whether the Council of Common Interests(CCI), National Finance Commission (NFC), and the judiciary, through their inaction or actions in conspiracy, are only conspiring to arrest or accelerate the process of devolution.

4. Analysis of the impact of the Amendment on the delivery of service, fiscal autonomy, and local governance in selected Provinces, in particular the circumstances of Baluchistan, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, etc.
5. This essay attempts to learn about how the Amendment influenced national integration and the politics of identity of different federating units, and in particular of individual federating units and ethnic minorities.
6. Based on this, we recommend a policy for strengthening cooperative federalism in Pakistan by instituting capacity building and better center-province relations as institutional reform.

With these objectives, the study attempts to contribute to academic and policy debates on the federal future of Pakistan and the implementation of provincial autonomy envisaged in the 18th Amendment.

### Research Methodology

This study employs a qualitative dominant mixed-method approach to studying the evolution of federalism in Pakistan, with special importance to the challenges and prospects of federalism, particularly after the 18th Constitutional Amendment. It aims to provide depth and breadth, combining historical, legal, and political views with stakeholder views and institutional data to be the ground from which the methodology operates.

The documentary study of constitutional texts, legislative amendments, and judicial decisions, as the historical and constitutional analysis, is the first. It examines the 1973 original Constitution, the 8th, the 17th, and the 18th Amendments, and related case law concerning federalism. First of all, it is crucial in the sense of understanding how the federal structure of Pakistan was developed and how the jurisdiction under Legislative and administrative authority was shaped in the light of the 18th Amendment (Arshad & Naazer, [n.d.](#)). They review key documents of the Constitution of Pakistan and its amendments, the Parliamentary Committee report on Constitutional Reform, judgments of the judiciary on devolution, and Annual reports and meeting summaries of the Council of Common Interests.

The second component consists of semi-structured interviews with focal points, urban planners, representatives of federal and provincial

legislators, bureaucrats dealing with intergovernmental coordination, constitutional experts, members of the civil society, and policy research institutions. Less riskily, the interviews provide insider perspectives on the formulation and work on the grounds of the 18th Amendment (Faiz, 2023). They examine why and how the Amendment's use incited political backlash, was thwarted by

bureaucratic hurdles, was authored alongside the center and the provinces, and how the Amendment was perceived to have benefited or damaged provincial interests. Interviews are recorded, transcribed, and then thematically coded to look for repeating patterns and finer details that do not fit within official narratives.

**Table 1**

*Provincial Implementation Post-18th Amendment*

Province	Devolved Ministries Implemented	Legislation Passed Post-Devolution	Challenges Noted
Sindh	15	20	Political interference, local government delays
Baluchistan	12	10	Capacity issues, limited fiscal autonomy
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	14	18	Better uptake, but coordination gaps with the federal government

The case study has been done in the third part of the methodology for the provinces of Sindh, Baluchistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The reason for choosing these provinces is that they have different political histories, structures of governance, and administrative capacities. Each case study evaluates the transfers of devolved subjects such as health, education, local governance, evolution in and response to fiscal and federal funding flows, provincial legislatures, and bureaucracies performance. Second, it seeks to understand the devolution in terms of the friction or cooperation between the federal and provincial governments within political disputes. By analyzing the differences across different contexts on how this happens, these case studies make available a tool for assessing the implementation and effectiveness of federal reforms.

Another aspect of the study is an institutional review of intergovernmental mechanisms, which includes an appraisal of the CCI and the National Finance Commission (NFC). They take stock of meeting frequencies, the decisions set and implementation status, and the budgetary allocations in line with public data, parliamentary reports, and expert commentary. Moreover, this component helps to ascertain how these institutions have effectively addressed mutual governance and

dispute issues in the post-eighteenth Amendment era.

All the collected data, such as legal documents, interviews, government publications, as well as case study observations, are applied to qualitative thematic content analysis to create an overview. Qualitative coding software organizes data into the themes of legal restructuring, implementation hurdles, fiscal decentralization, political resistance, provincial capacity, and national identity politics. Thus, this method is significant in two regards; first, it gives a unified and all-encompassing account of correctly interpreting, invoking, and contesting the 18th Amendment at different levels of governance.

Although some limitations are noted relating to the methodological depth. Internal documents may be restricted from access, in particular from deliberations conducted by CCI. There may be some interviewees who are precluded from giving fully transparent responses by political sensitivities. It also may not capture dynamics in all federating units because it focuses on three provinces. However, triangulating disparate data sources helps to secure the research's credibility by capturing an accurate and multi-dimensional perception of federalism in Pakistan after the 18th Amendment.

## Result Findings

It is observed that the 18th Constitutional Amendment led to a positive transformation in the pattern of federalism in Pakistan, but the implementation of this has resulted in a massive gap between constitutional inclination and actuality.


First, the amendment changed the federal architecture by withdrawing the 17 ministries from the federal character and removing the Concurrent Legislative List. This has thus created a wider space for and aided provincial legislation and policymaking in the areas of education, health, and social welfare. Provinces have themselves taken very significant steps in establishing independent departments, passing provincial laws, and tailoring development priorities to local needs.

Still, the actual implementation has been spotty. Provincial capacity was restricted due to the

province's lack of ability to mobilize administrative personnel, training, and infrastructure construction that could ensure effective governance after devolution. In some cases, federal ministries also operated unofficially to influence areas that were to be devolved, which added to the confusion and tension between governments regarding jurisdictions.

Fiscal federalism will be the main sticking point. Although an NFC Award provides the option of vertical resource distribution, delays in signing new NFC agreements and augmentative conditional transfers of funds have actually constrained real fiscal autonomy. Many provinces are unable to raise their own revenue and are forced to rely on federal allocations just to survive.

Figure 2



Setting federal-provincial disputes would have been the role of the inconsistent body known as the Council of Common Interests (CCI). Meetings have been irregular, and deadlines for decisions have been ignored.

In other words, the experience shows that the 18th Amendment really was an opportunity for real federalism, but only if the institutions are strengthened, intergovernmental cooperation is promoted, and politics is made more robust.

## Discussion

The 18th Constitutional Amendment of Pakistan's federal structure is a large and significant reordering. However, this study shows that the

transformative potential of the amendment has been only partially realized because of political, institutional, and intergovernmental framework shortcomings. These findings are discussed in the light of their implications and conclude that the post-18th Amendment federalism in Pakistan has witnessed successes and as many losses as there are days in the year.

As for the most notable outcome of the amendment, it is, of course, its formalization of provincial autonomy. The amendment that came into force did away with the Concurrent Legislative List and devolved the authority of key service sectors to smaller provinces in fulfillment of long-pending demands for greater self-governance. Principally

speaking, the change in the structure indicated that Pakistan was now in line with the federal vision of the 1973 Constitution and positively contributed towards the current worldwide trend of decentralization. However, progress made in legislative and institutional terms by provinces such as Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa indicates that there is a possibility of such a framework for federalism when it is politically sanctioned and administratively driven.

Yet, in reality, federalism is under strain. Another commonly found finding is that the province is not ready to receive arrivals; they have no administrative readiness. Constitutional control over such vital sectors was made possible only by the powers provinces thus obtained, which, however, also had their own inadequate bureaucratic apparatus and financial independence to carry out their policies. This has included weakness and inconsistency in service delivery, coupled with reconsidering using federal support, which opposes the spirit of autonomy.

The Amendment, moreover, was capable of making institutions extremely ambiguous, above all as regards the relationships between central and regional governments. Aimed to be the principal forum for settling disputes and coordinating common interests, the Council of Common Interests (CCI) has not operated regularly and in a commensurate manner. At the same time, political tensions between the center and provinces and between rival parties have further undermined the cooperation. It has also happened several times when the Federal Government tried to reassert control over devolved subjects through administrative order or judicial interpretations and bring centralist momentum to its surmount.

Fiscal issues compound these tensions. The delay in announcing the new National Finance Commission (NFC) Award and dependence on conditional federal grants have also eroded provincial control over development decisions. Without a strong and predictable fiscal framework that does not allow provinces to turn their autonomy into concrete governance outcomes, they are still financially exposed.

Politically, the Amendment has been mixed. While it has given provincial actors relatively more leeway and registered more diversity of regional representation, it has also produced new lines of

fracture in the nation's politics. Identity politics have come mainstream, and there is no strong tier at the local government level, which leaves the field open for provincial, not regional, governments to exert power and to focus just on electricity rather than power at the grassroots.

The second was the legal and political foundations of federalism in Pakistan; though the promise of full autonomy is not realized, the 18th Amendment has finally contributed. To help DE develop a more functional and cooperative federal system, institutional strengthening is needed, particularly at the provincial level, and the politicization of DE into these intergovernmental bodies. Further, local government empowerment and fiscal equity guided by a new commitment will be crucial for realizing the goals of devolution and ensuring that federalism lives up to its democratic and developmental potential.

## **Conclusion**

The origins of Federalism in Pakistan have been a historical legacy, a political centralization check, constitutional reform, and democratic aspirations. The 18th Constitutional Amendment is perhaps one of many important events on the trajectory that attempted to give legitimacy to the center-province space in a new democratic way. The aim was to secure the framework of federal cooperation and decentralization through the abolition of the Concurrent Legislative list and devolution of legislative and administrative powers to such institutions as the Council of Common Interests, etc. That was a brave legislative move as it promised to stop the longstanding grievances of provincial marginalization and described a new order of participatory politics.

It concludes that the amendment saw the birth of a total true revolution in the legal framework of federalism in the country. Constitutionally speaking, these powers are now devolved down to provinces in specific areas—to provinces of education, health, social welfare, and environmental policy. This has attracted increased legislative activity in some provinces like Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and provincial innovation in the supply of public services. As a result of the amendment, the debate on provincial rights, distribution of resources, and national integration

has resurfaced to create space for debates suppressed by centralized rule.

However, the result also indicates that even constitutional reform alone cannot enact effective federalism. After the 18th Amendment, the main difficulty was to develop the capabilities of the provincial governments to carry out their newly acquired potential to a great extent. Most provinces are immensely dependent on the federal government through fiscal dependence, and their institutions and human resources are weak. This process of devolution has then been wrapped up in a very devolved process at the time, which was only really symbolic at that time. On the practical side, there are still other functions that have been constitutionally devolved upon other ministries and agencies, and still, these are affected either directly or indirectly by such ministries and agencies. The persistence of federal control in these areas, however, has been responsible for undermining the fact that the Amendment itself was meant to provide, and has thus not allowed the autonomy it was supposed to provide.

Inter-government bodies such as CCI are considered another major drawback, as their functioning is irregular. The theory has helped strengthen the CCI, but it has not been able to perform the role assigned to it, that of an impartial arbiter of federal and provincial disputes and a forum for consensus-building. The institution has been weakened in terms of credibility and efficiency by killing the idea of Irregular meetings, hatred, and political disagreements. It does so, too: the political context is there, no doubt about it. As far as provincial and federal governments are concerned, they have been pitted against each other in a relationship, so to speak, between the two provinces, where each pursues its own ends as it relates to that watershed area of policy. This dynamic is then not only an impediment to governance but also a fuel to political polarization in contradiction to cooperative federalism's objectives. In addition, because there is no autonomous grassroots involvement at the provincial level, devolution has almost ceased, and devolution has hardly occurred.

Although this exists, the 18th Amendment is a brilliant move in the history of Pakistan's constitution. In other words, it is the call that some

political ethic shift has occurred in the nation from authoritarianism and centralism to democratic pluralism and decentralization. It has likewise triggered fundamental talk about the feeling and execution of federalism in a level minority society. Thanks to an amendment, the provincial governments now have power, and the regionals, through their voices, have paved the way for a more balanced and inclusive national governance structure.

But all this has to be taken in several steps. Secondly, the provincial level must invest in human capital, administrative reform, and infrastructure development in the first breast-building institutional capacity. The second is that the federal government has to prove a commitment to respect the constitutional limits provided by the Amendment and refuse to violate the domains given under devolution. Third, although the CCI and NFC should be aided to function as coordination and dispute facilities, they should also be endowed, depoliticized, and made more transparent to do the job. It brings federalism back into existence and gives it a shot in the arm through the revival and empowerment of local governments to touch the grassroots.

Meanwhile, federal and provincial governments must also ensure they fully abide by the principles of federalism; civil society, academia, and media should continue playing watchdog roles. There could also be ways through which public awareness campaigns and civic education could better help to keep the democratic norms, and also help increase citizen participation in the governance of the federal government.

Finally, the 18th Amendment is not an end but a basis. The architecture of this can assist in distinguishing a federal Pakistan, but will only do so if institutions are willing and capable of doing so, political actors are mature, and civil society is engaged. Building a process of routine cooperation between federation building and efficiency of the process is complex; this is a long and arduous path for Pakistan to take if there stands sustained effort; Pakistan can move towards a model of unity, diversity, authority, and autonomy and preserve responsibility of the central leadership and provincial potency.

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