

p-ISSN : 2521-2982 | e-ISSN : 2707-4587

DOI(Journal): 10.31703/gpr

DOI(Volume): 10.31703/gpr/.2024(IX)

DOI(Issue): 10.31703/gpr.2024(IX.IV)



GLOBAL
Political
REVIEW *empowering humanity*

GPR

GLOBAL POLITICAL REVIEW
HEC-RECOGNIZED CATEGORY-Y

VOL. IX, ISSUE IV, FALL (DECEMBER-2024)

Article Title

The Shift of Power from The US Decline to China's Rise in Africa: The Geopolitical Implications of Washington's Strategic Withdrawal from Niger

Global Political Review

p-ISSN: 2521-2982 e-ISSN: 2707-4587

DOI (journal): 10.31703/gpr

Volume: IX (2024)

DOI (volume): 10.31703/gpr.2024(IX)

Issue: IV Fall (December-2024)

DOI(Issue): 10.31703/gpr.2024(IX-IV)

Home Page

www.gprjournal.com

Volume: IX (2024)

<https://www.gprjournal.com/Current-issues>

Issue: IV-Fall (December-2024)

<https://www.gprjournal.com/issues/9/4/2024>

Scope

<https://www.gprjournal.com/about-us/scope>

Submission

<https://humaglobe.com/index.php/gpr/submissions>

Google Scholar



Visit Us



Abstract

Africa has emerged as the focal point of the growing international competition between China and the United States in recent years. This study examines how power is changing in Africa, emphasizing China's expanding influence despite the United States' declining influence. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has altered Africa's infrastructure and economic landscape, is crucial to this change. However, United States' influence on the continent has diminished due to a decline in diplomatic activity, less foreign aid, and reduced economic initiatives. In particular, China and the United States are engaged in a geopolitical struggle to control Africa's markets, political alliances, and natural resource wealth. Due to its wealth of resources and quickly growing economy, which offer tremendous potential for political, military, and economic cooperation, Africa is a prime target in the broader geopolitical struggle between these two giants. Both nations have used various tactics and instruments to protect their interests.

Keywords: U.S.-China Influence, African Geopolitics, Economic and Political Influence, Nigeria

Authors:

Zosha Noor: M.Phil. Scholar, Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan.

Muhammad Saqib: PhD Scholar, Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan.

Imran Wakil: (Corresponding Author)
Assistant Professor (OPS), Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan.
(Email: imranwakil@gcuf.edu.pk)

Pages: 64-79

DOI:10.31703/gssr.2024(IX-IV).06

DOI link: [https://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2024\(IX-IV\).06](https://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2024(IX-IV).06)

Article link: <http://www.gprjournal.com/article/A-b-c>

Full-text Link: <https://gprjournal.com/fulltext/>

Pdf link: <https://www.gprjournal.com/jadmin/Author/3urvlolA2.pdf>

Citing this Article

o6	The Shift of Power from The US Decline to China's Rise in Africa: The Geopolitical Implications of Washington's Strategic Withdrawal from Niger						
	Author	Zosha Noor Muhammad Saqib Imran Wakil		DOI	10.31703/gpr.2024(IX-IV).o6		
Pages	64-79	Year	2024	Volume	IX	Issue	IV
Referencing & Citing Styles	APA	Noor, Z., Saqib, M., & Wakil, I. (2024). The Shift of Power from The US Decline to China's Rise in Africa: The Geopolitical Implications of Washington's Strategic Withdrawal from Niger. <i>Global Political Review</i> , IX(IV), 64-79. https://doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2024(IX-IV).16					
	CHICAGO	Noor, Zosha, Muhammad Saqib, and Imran Wakil. 2024. "The Shift of Power from The US Decline to China's Rise in Africa: The Geopolitical Implications of Washington's Strategic Withdrawal from Niger." <i>Global Political Review</i> IX (IV):64-79. doi: 10.31703/gpr.2024(IX-IV).16.					
	HARVARD	NOOR, Z., SAQIB, M. & WAKIL, I. 2024. The Shift of Power from The US Decline to China's Rise in Africa: The Geopolitical Implications of Washington's Strategic Withdrawal from Niger. <i>Global Political Review</i> IX, 64-79.					
	MHRA	Noor, Zosha, Muhammad Saqib, and Imran Wakil. 2024. 'The Shift of Power from The US Decline to China's Rise in Africa: The Geopolitical Implications of Washington's Strategic Withdrawal from Niger', <i>Global Political Review</i> , IX: 64-79.					
	MLA	Noor, Zosha, Muhammad Saqib, and Imran Wakil. "The Shift of Power from the Us Decline to China's Rise in Africa: The Geopolitical Implications of Washington's Strategic Withdrawal from Niger." <i>Global Political Review</i> IX.IV (2024): 64-79. Print.					
	OXFORD	Noor, Zosha, Saqib, Muhammad, and Wakil, Imran (2024), 'The Shift of Power from The US Decline to China's Rise in Africa: The Geopolitical Implications of Washington's Strategic Withdrawal from Niger', <i>Global Political Review</i> IX (IV), 64-79.					
TURABIAN	Noor, Zosha, Muhammad Saqib, and Imran Wakil. "The Shift of Power from the Us Decline to China's Rise in Africa: The Geopolitical Implications of Washington's Strategic Withdrawal from Niger." <i>Global Political Review</i> IX, no. IV (2024): 64-79. https://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gpr.2024(IX-IV).16 .						



Cite Us



Title

The Shift of Power from The US Decline to China's Rise in Africa: The Geopolitical Implications of Washington's Strategic Withdrawal from Niger

Abstract

Africa has emerged as the focal point of the growing international competition between China and the United States in recent years. This study examines how power is changing in Africa, emphasizing China's expanding influence despite the United States' declining influence. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has altered Africa's infrastructure and economic landscape, is crucial to this change. However, United States' influence on the continent has diminished due to a decline in diplomatic activity, less foreign aid, and reduced economic initiatives. In particular, China and the United States are engaged in a geopolitical struggle to control Africa's markets, political alliances, and natural resource wealth. Due to its wealth of resources and quickly growing economy, which offer tremendous potential for political, military, and economic cooperation, Africa is a prime target in the broader geopolitical struggle between these two giants. Both nations have used various tactics and instruments to protect their interests.

Keywords:

[U.S.-China Influence, African Geopolitics, Economic and Political Influence, Nigeria](#)

Contents

- [Introduction](#)
- [History of U.S. Engagement in Africa](#)
- [History of China's Engagement in Africa](#)
- [Political Interests](#)
- [Economic Interests](#)
- [Security Interests](#)
- [Economic Rivalry: Competing for Influence via Investments](#)
- [Cultural Soft Power: Battling for Hearts and Minds](#)
- [Political Contest: Democracy vs. Authoritarianism](#)
- [Rethinking the U.S. Approach to African Economic Partnerships](#)
- [The Withdrawal of US Troops from Niger](#)
- [Conclusion](#)
- [References](#)

Authors:

Zosha Noor: M.Phil. Scholar, Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan.

Muhammad Saqib: PhD Scholar, Department of International Relations, Government College University Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan.

Imran Wakil: (Corresponding Author)
Assistant Professor (OPS),
Department of International Relations,
Government College University
Faisalabad, Punjab, Pakistan.
(Email: imranwakil@gcuf.edu.pk)

Introduction

Africa has always been important to the balance of power in the world because of its long history of

civilization and extensive trade routes. Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, Britain, and France were among the nations that colonized it from the 15th to the



20th centuries. These colonial nations were deeply involved in the exploitation of Africa's resources and the transatlantic slave trade, moving millions of Africans to the Americas. Centuries of colonization left permanent effects on Africa's infrastructure, political systems, and socioeconomic structures, significantly entrenching disparities (Falola, 2003; Iliffe, 2017). Africa, with its vast natural resources and the second-largest population globally, remains an appealing territory for external powers. The continent is home to large deposits of oil, minerals, and other commodities crucial to global markets. For decades, Africa's economic potential has garnered international attention, with governments fighting for access to its resources. In recent decades, the focus has turned towards geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. This modern battle, while not military, displays strategic economic maneuvering as both governments attempt to create relationships that will suit their long-term aims (Singh, 2024).

China has greatly increased its influence through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), spending extensively on infrastructure projects across Africa. This project comprises numerous high-profile initiatives, such as the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway and the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway. These initiatives have not only promoted China's economic interests but also positioned it as a significant development partner for African countries (Brautigam, 2011). China's Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) continues to be a significant vehicle for deepening these partnerships, with Chinese financial institutions surpassing Western nations in lending to Africa (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). On the military front, China has extended its footprint by establishing a base in Djibouti and giving military aid and training to numerous African governments. Under its FOCAC framework, China has offered both military and security aid to the area, which opponents in the West perceive as a strategic move to gain political and economic influence (Kostecka-Tomaszewska & Krukowska, 2021). Nonetheless, China characterizes its cooperation as a mutually beneficial relationship centered on development and peacekeeping activities.

In response to China's expanding participation in Africa, the United States renewed its diplomatic outreach, particularly with the 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit, hosted in Washington, D.C. This summit, the first in eight years aimed to boost U.S.-

African relations by tackling crucial issues such as food security, healthcare, and infrastructure development. President Biden's administration proposed a \$55 billion aid plan as part of the U.S.'s broader goal to increase collaboration with Africa in conformity with the African Union's Agenda 2063. The 2023 visit of Vice President Kamala Harris further strengthened these promises, emphasizing U.S. ambitions to deepen its ties with African states. In terms of military activity, the U.S. operates many significant sites in Africa, including those in Niger, Djibouti, and Kenya. These stations are part of bigger operations to combat terrorism, support African armed forces, and defend American interests. They also play a significant role in intelligence-sharing and regional security cooperation (Zhu & Gao, 2024). Moreover, the U.S. remains the leading contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions, many of which are deployed in Africa to resolve continuing conflicts and disasters.

While the U.S. and China's rivalry offers issues for African states, it also opens up new prospects for economic growth and development. Both nations are making considerable investments across the continent, particularly in infrastructure and trade, which might help accelerate improvement in many African countries. However, African leaders must carefully handle the intricate connections with major global powers to avoid becoming unduly reliant on either side (Power, 2019). The rising battle between China and the United States for influence in Africa has gained global attention, with both governments utilizing unique techniques to safeguard their objectives. At the same time, they pitch their cooperation as helpful for Africa's progress and prosperity. This article dives into the U.S.-China rivalry in Africa, and the basic causes of U.S.-China rivalry in Africa, identifying the three sectors where their competition is most pronounced, economic investment, security, and political influence. In doing so, it also addresses how this competition impacts African countries and explores the developing African reaction to negotiating the contradictory constraints of aligning with these superpowers while defending regional interests.

History of U.S. Engagement in Africa

Before World War II, the United States had a low interest in Africa, partly due to its colonial status.

This caused Washington to interact with the colonial powers—Britain, France, and Portugal—rather than directly with African nations (Cohen, 2019). At that time, Africa was not considered geostrategically significant to the U.S. However, during World War II, the U.S. began to appreciate the continent's strategic importance, particularly for the delivery of supplies between the West and East. African airfields became crucial, as did the extraction of uranium oxide from Congo, which was essential for the creation of nuclear weapons by American engineers. This signified a change toward realizing the need for a foreign strategy focused on Africa.

Washington adopted an anti-colonial position ensuring its success in the war and placing pressure on colonial powers to decolonize African nations. The 1941 Atlantic Charter, agreed by the U.S. and Britain, established the foundation for this by advocating for post-war self-determination, disarmament, and respect for state sovereignty (Reeves, 2014). As African states approached independence, President Dwight Eisenhower saw the need for a more defined policy toward Africa. The post-independence era saw the U.S. try numerous techniques, including President Nixon's focus on a small number of "concentration countries" exhibiting potential for development. Later, under President Carter, the U.S. turned its efforts towards addressing fundamental human needs such as clean water and health measures, particularly targeting malaria and children's ailments (Gerits, 2017).

The U.S.-Africa relationship evolved further under President Clinton, particularly with the passing of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000, which aimed to deepen economic relationships by granting African nations duty-free access to U.S. markets. President George W. Bush boosted U.S. commitment through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the greatest government project addressing a single illness, which drastically reduced HIV/AIDS-related fatalities in Africa (Cohen, 2019). Building on this, President Obama proposed the Power Africa program to solve the continent's electricity shortages and inaugurated the Young African Leaders program, which develops leadership and collaboration with U.S. President Trump's Africa strategy essentially mirrored Obama's objectives.

However, notable triumphs included the Prosper Africa program, which facilitated over 800 commercial partnerships between U.S. and African businesses, resulting in \$50 billion in trade and investment (Odularu, 2020).

The Biden administration has exhibited increased commitment to the continent with the 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit and the launch of an official "U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa" in 2022, which aims to enhance diplomatic relations and development collaboration. The U.S. has engaged in Sub-Saharan Africa for almost eight decades, focusing on economic development, health initiatives, and fostering diplomatic relations. While U.S. administrations have fluctuated in their amount of focus on Africa, recent moves reflect a continuous commitment to the continent's development and mutual prosperity.

History of China's Engagement in Africa

Sino-African contacts extend back to the medieval period, starting through trade enabled by Chinese maritime expeditions along the northeastern coast of Africa. During the Ming Dynasty, the famed mariner Zheng He undertook journeys around the Horn of Africa, bringing presents such as precious metals, porcelain, and silk, and receiving in return exotic things like giraffes and zebras. In the early 20th century, modern Sino-African engagement began, primarily through contacts with the South African government due to a sizable Chinese immigrant community (Shinn, 2019). However, during the Mao Zedong era, China's focus was mostly on domestic matters as it consolidated its newly founded People's Republic. In the 1950s, contact between China and African states strengthened through bilateral trade agreements (Meibo & Xie, 2013). A big milestone was accomplished when Premier Zhou Enlai toured eleven African countries in 1963 and 1964. This tour attempted to improve diplomatic ties, challenge Soviet influence, represent China as a worldwide power, and acquire insights to develop its African policy (Scalapino, 1964).

Despite these diplomatic endeavors, China's economic contributions to Africa during this period were small due to its internal economic woes. Total aid to Africa under Mao amounted to roughly USD 2.4 billion, with the Tanzanian-Zambian railway project being the most significant undertaking.

Additionally, Chinese military support expanded in the 1970s, with China training nearly 3,000 African soldiers from thirteen different nations between 1955 and 1979 (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). Beneficiary countries included Cameroon, Egypt, Sudan, and Zambia, among others, with China contributing military assets like aircraft and tanks. Overall, the first seven decades of the 20th century saw incremental improvement in the political, economic, and military links between China and Africa. Deng Xiaoping oversaw a renewed commitment to Africa in Mao's leadership. In 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang undertook a tour comparable to Zhou Enlai's, underlining China's commitment to the continent. Ziyang drew forth four important concepts for Sino-African relations: equality and non-interference, broader economic cooperation, diversification of projects, and an emphasis on African self-reliance. Jiang Zemin's reign in the 1990s substantially advanced China's engagement with Africa. High-level trips, such as President Zemin's visits to East, West, and Southern Africa in 1996, were symptomatic of China's rising interest in Africa. This decade also saw the founding of the Forum on China-Africa Collaboration (FOCAC) in 1999, aiming at strengthening mutual friendship and collaboration. Since its creation, FOCAC has hosted multiple summits, the most recent being held in Dakar, Senegal, in 2021.

Under Hu Jintao, Sino-African relations enjoyed tremendous expansion. Trade between the two regions rose from USD 10 billion to USD 180 billion in just ten years, and by 2009, China had surpassed the United States as Africa's top commercial partner (Shinn, 2019). Xi Jinping's presidency has been distinguished by more active diplomacy, particularly in Africa. His strategies toward the continent stress political trust, financial cooperation, technological partnership, and peace promotion. A significant feature of Xi's Africa strategy is the Belt and Road Initiative, in which 39 African nations are now participants (Myers, 2020). China's focus on creating confidence with African leaders through economic and diplomatic means has allowed it to access the continent's natural resources and strengthen ties. China's engagement with Africa has historically eclipsed that of the U.S., especially in the areas of trade and high-level diplomatic attention. While both China and the U.S. have been essential in Africa's growth, it remains uncertain if their

presence will evolve into cooperation or competition.

China's Strategic Involvement in Africa

China's rising presence in Africa has aroused concerns from U.S. politicians, who perceive this as a potential strategic threat. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has maintained diplomatic links with practically every nation in Africa, contacts that were largely forged during the Cold War era. These linkages were further institutionalized through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), created in 2000, which provides a platform for high-level communication between China and African governments. Some members of the U.S. Congress have stated that China's expanding influence in Africa undermines U.S. foreign policy objectives and poses concerns to national security. This perspective corresponds with the Biden Administration's emphasis on strategic competition with China, with the U.S. Secretary of Defense characterizing China's operations in Africa as destabilizing.

China's involvement in Africa is primarily driven by a desire to grow trade, financial, and investment connections, while also obtaining international support for its policies. Africa's strong supply of natural resources, such as key minerals, is crucial to China's manufacturing sector, boosting its demand for goods from the continent. Chinese businesses are heavily involved in infrastructure projects throughout Africa, supported by loans from the state that frequently require the use of Chinese products and services. However, this financial involvement has pushed several African nations toward debt problems by increasing their levels of national debt. China and African nations have geopolitical and economic ties. In terms of economics, they benefit from rising exports, easy access to finance, and cheap commodities; in terms of geopolitics, they could desire to expand their international alliances or back China's goals. Africa's public perceptions of China are mixed, with studies from South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya indicating more positive opinions than those from other areas. Polling data also shows that opinions on China's impact are typically favorable, especially in countries that praise China's growth model, such as Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali.


Every African nation, with the exception of Eswatini, which continues to recognize Taiwan, has diplomatic relations with China. China has created a systematic framework for collaboration through FOCAC, which includes programs to support Africa's industrialization, agricultural modernization, and talent development. Multilateral institutions like the United Nations and the BRICS coalition of emerging countries also play a significant role in promoting China-Africa cooperation. South Africa, Angola, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are currently China's top commercial partners in Africa. Trade between China and Africa reached \$243 billion by 2022. China imports most of its goods from Africa in the form of fossil fuels and vital minerals needed for vital industries.

China's economic involvement with Africa is greatly influenced by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which promotes international investment and economic collaboration. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has allowed China to dominate Africa's mining and energy sectors through large

investments in nations like the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Between 2005 and 2022, Chinese companies spent over \$90 billion in Africa, with significant benefits for the DRC, South Africa, and Guinea. During the same time period, China gave around \$156 billion in loans to African nations, with the main recipients being Angola, Ethiopia, and Kenya. These loans, which are mostly utilized for energy and infrastructure projects, have significantly increased Africa's financial difficulties (Dunford, 2021). On the security front, China's presence in Africa has risen. Though Russia is Africa's leading arms supplier, China is the second-largest, with nations such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Angola key users of Chinese arms. China's military presence in Africa includes creating its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017, strategically positioned near a U.S. Navy base. This has aroused concerns about China's rising military footprint in the region. China also plays a large part in U.N. peacekeeping operations, contributing approximately 2,000 personnel, especially to African missions (Oscar M Otele, 2020).

Figure 1

Chinese Loans to Africa, 2000-2022



Source: Chinese Loans to Africa Database, 2023. Boston University Global Development Policy Center.


The total external debt due by sub-Saharan African countries amounts to \$454.4 billion. However, China is not the principal debt holder and it controls \$79 billion of total debt, constituting under one-fifth, or

17%. In the meantime, bondholders, the World Bank, and the IMF collectively possess \$286.9 billion, representing 63% of sub-Saharan Africa's entire foreign debt.

Figure 2

Sub-Saharan Africa's largest lenders (USD)

Total loans outstanding in 2021



Source: World Bank

From the U.S. standpoint, China's expanding influence in Africa is seen as a challenge to American interests. The Biden administration has indicated that China intends to restructure the international order to its favor and diminish U.S. ties with African nations (KERBOUB Sawsen, 2023). In response, Congress has established many financial vehicles, such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and the Countering PRC Influence Fund, to promote U.S. aims in Africa (Edeh & Han, 2023). Current congressional debates revolve around the implications of China's ownership over important mineral resources, its influence on the African government, and the balance of U.S.-China commerce in the region (Ngobeni, Ndlovu, & Hofisi, 2023). China's expanding presence in Africa presents both opportunities and problems for the area, while also raising strategic worries for the United States, particularly in economic and security domains.

China's Expanding Influence in Africa: Economic, Diplomatic, and Security Dimensions

China's strategic motives for participation in Africa are numerous and contain several essential objectives. Primarily, China seeks access to basic resources, including energy, minerals, and agricultural products, all of which are critical to supporting its economic growth. Furthermore, China intends to improve its economic engagement with Africa through increasing trade, investment, and aid, which manifests as grants, loans, and debt

relief measures. Additionally, whereas the U.S. operates mostly inside a "bipolar system," China seeks to support a multipolar global framework, where it plays a vital role. Another key political purpose is China's pursuit of worldwide support to replace Taiwan's diplomatic recognition with Beijing's representation.

Political Interests

China wants diplomatic and political connections across Africa, a strategy that has achieved tremendous success over the years. While these aims are multi-faceted, the overall purpose is to solidify diplomatic support for China on the global stage. Consequently, this approach has endowed Beijing with a considerable base of sympathizers inside the international community, particularly within institutions such as the United Nations (Jakobson, 2009). Further, China has targeted undermining Taiwan's diplomatic presence in Africa, with an overarching goal of winning political support from as many of Africa's 54 governments as possible.

China's political engagement in Africa relies on garnering diplomatic support, particularly on matters connected to its sovereignty and global power. One of the main goals of the "One China" policy is for China to lessen Taiwan's diplomatic influence. Today, practically all African countries recognize Beijing over Taipei, adding to China's long-standing political goal of isolating Taiwan on the world stage. This diplomatic support extends beyond the One China issue, as African states

consistently vote in favor of China's objectives at the United States and other international venues. China regards this alliance as crucial in gaining votes on resolutions and decisions that could harm its interests, notably in questions of human rights and trade restrictions. This network of African friends further provides China with power as it strives to establish itself as a leader within a multipolar global system, which contrasts with the U.S.-dominated post-Cold War era.

Economic Interests


China's economic engagement with Africa depends on obtaining access to essential resources, such as oil, minerals, and food, to meet its increasing population and industrial demand. Additionally, the developing African consumer market is tempting to China, offering the potential to sell items ranging from technology to medical supplies. China's investment strategy in Africa is connected with its "Go Global" program, which intends to enhance outbound investment and grow Chinese company presence abroad (KERBOUB Sawsen, 2023). China's economic objectives in Africa can be grouped into three key areas: securing a stable supply of natural resources, developing a significant market for Chinese exports, and creating opportunities for Chinese firms to gain expertise and generate employment. Through this multidimensional approach, Beijing wants a long-term economic engagement with African countries that will support progress on both sides.

Economically, Africa is a vital partner for China, acting as a substantial supplier of raw materials and a promising market for Chinese exports. China's industrial sectors require resources like copper, cobalt, and oil, which are abundant in Africa. These minerals are essential for electronics, energy production, and renewable technologies. China views Africa as a way to maintain its economic growth by increasing demand for Chinese goods and services, given that its domestic market and need for investment are oversaturated. China has made large expenditures in ports, trains, and other infrastructure as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in order to increase trade routes that will help Chinese exports.

Due to its youthful and rising population, Africa also offers a growing customer base, making it a long-term market for Chinese technology, consumer products, and manufacturing. China is keen to aid Africa in developing its industrial capacity to do so, offering both financial and technical support through programs such as economic zones and industrial parks. In recent years, China's Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) has greatly expanded the quantity of loans it provides to African governments with the aim of integrating African markets with China's economic framework. These investments not only supply China with raw resources but also boost the continent's economy and increase China's soft power in Africa by enhancing infrastructure and creating employment.

Figure 3

Africa-China Trade Balance, 2000-2022



Source: Boston University Global Development Policy Center, 2024. Data Source: UNCTAD Comtrade.

Security Interests

China's security objectives in Africa are mostly defensive, with a focus on protecting its people and economic resources. China has utilized this strategy to participate in U.N.-backed peacekeeping missions in countries like South Sudan and Mali and to station naval forces in the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy under a U.N. mandate. As seen by the 2007 kidnapping of nine Chinese workers in Nigeria, Chinese nationals in Africa confront a range of security threats, from politically driven incidents to criminal activities like theft and kidnapping. When opposition parties invaded Sino Hydro's construction site in Sudan in 2012, 29 Chinese workers were abducted, illustrating the complicated security situation that Chinese people face throughout Africa.


The security of its people, investments, and major infrastructure projects in Africa are China's top priorities. As Chinese investments have spread throughout the continent, so too have the hazards to Chinese assets and workers. Growing crime rates, political instability, and anti-foreign sentiment provide security difficulties for Chinese companies and individuals doing business in nations like Nigeria, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In response to these concerns, China has stepped up its security commitment in Africa and is currently one of the largest non-African contributors to U.N. peacekeeping efforts. In conflict-prone regions like South Sudan and Mali, Chinese military aid in stabilizing areas inhabited by Chinese citizens and interests. Additionally, Djibouti, which is well located at the crossroads of significant trade routes, was the site of China's first overseas military post in 2017. The Chinese military can use this station to conduct anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, safeguarding its commercial routes and maritime interests against piracy.

In an effort to prevent the growth of terrorism and organized crime, which might lead to instability in regions where China has interests, China is becoming more involved in African security. China and the African Union, for example, have joined forces to fight piracy in the waterways surrounding East Africa. Additionally, China has expanded the quantity of military equipment and training it supplies to African countries as part of its security aid programs. This not only safeguards Chinese interests but also improves its political connections with African nations by casting China as a credible security partner.

Figure 4

Africa Exports and Imports to China by Sector, 2000-2022



Source: Boston University Global Development Policy Center and African Economic Research Consortium, 2024.

U.S.-China Competition in Africa: Emerging Arenas of Influence

Although there is room for cooperation between the

US and China in Africa, as was previously mentioned, the fact remains that both nations are strategic rivals in a "great power rivalry" that

continues to influence world geopolitics. Africa, with its booming economies, youthful population, and enormous natural resources, is becoming a critical battleground where this competition unfolds. As China spreads its influence across the continent and the U.S. attempts to deepen its participation under the Biden administration, three primary realms of competition—economic, cultural, and political—are expected to escalate.

Economic Rivalry: Competing for Influence via Investments

Economic competition is the most apparent and direct arena where China and the U.S. battle for dominance in Africa. Historically, the United States was the largest foreign direct investor in the continent, but this changed in 2011 when China overtook the U.S. and has since maintained its position as Africa's top investor.

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), started in 2013, has heightened this competitiveness. The BRI aspires to reconstruct old trade routes and strengthen China's global economic power by investing in infrastructure projects spanning Africa, Asia, and Europe. The effort involves large-scale investments in African railways, highways, ports, and power plants, with China's influence on African coastline countries—particularly in West and East Africa—raising concerns about possible future military expansions (Martelli & Dijkstra, 2022). One of the major BRI projects in Africa is Kenya's high-speed railway from Nairobi to Mombasa, while other substantial investments include oil pipelines in Nigeria and infrastructural projects in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Angola (Krpec & Wise, 2021).

The U.S., on the other hand, has mostly concentrated on stabilizing African economies through health programs, governance changes, and trade policies, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). However, there is concern that China's rising economic and military influence in oil-rich African nations could damage U.S. interests. While America's current quest for energy independence has lessened its need for African oil, access to Africa's markets and natural resources remains essential for both nations. The competition for these resources, notably oil, might intensify tensions between Washington and Beijing in the years ahead.

Cultural Soft Power: Battling for Hearts and Minds

While economic investments are one dimension of influence, both the U.S. and China are also aiming to win over African hearts and minds through cultural and educational programs, thereby extending their soft power across the continent. Soft power, as coined by Joseph Nye, refers to the ability of a country to attract and persuade through its culture, values, and diplomacy, rather than by coercion.

China has dramatically scaled up its soft power activities in Africa, primarily through the development of Confucius Institutes, which promote the Chinese language and culture. These institutes have become an essential tool in extending Chinese influence and generating goodwill throughout African states. However, some contend that Confucius Institutes also function as vehicles for Chinese propaganda and possible espionage (Anshan, 2021). Despite such complaints, China's cultural engagement remains strong in Africa, with African public opinion overwhelmingly embracing Chinese involvement due to perceived gains in infrastructure and economic growth (Kurlantzick, 2022; Oscar Meywa Otele, 2023).

In contrast, the United States has taken a different approach through initiatives like the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), which strives to empower the next generation of African leaders by delivering leadership training, professional development, and educational exchanges. YALI was founded under the Obama administration and remains one of the U.S.'s most significant attempts to foster long-term ties with Africa's young, thereby laying a basis for future U.S.-Africa collaboration. The initiative's flagship program, the Mandela Washington Fellowship, invites hundreds of African leaders to the U.S. for training and networking opportunities, forging strong linkages between future African leaders and the U.S. (Kamanzi, 2023).

Both nations understand that cultural influence and educational exchange programs may generate strong, long-lasting partnerships. While China has the advantage of its enormous infrastructure projects, the U.S. continues to exploit its reputation as a champion of education, democracy, and human rights in Africa. These soft power methods will

continue to be a significant battleground for U.S.-China combat in the years ahead.

Political Contest: Democracy vs. Authoritarianism

China's political model, often referred to as "authoritarian capitalism," has drawn more attention as a substitute for Western liberal democracy, and emerging countries continue to be impressed by its swift economic rise. By suggesting a system of strong centralized authority coupled with economic openness, the Beijing Consensus provides many African countries going through political and economic upheaval with an alluring path forward.

In Africa, the United States has continuously supported democracy and good governance, often basing its aid on improvements in democracy and human rights. On the other side, China's non-interference stance allows it to engage with African countries without putting pressure on them to enact democratic changes. Decision-makers in Washington are concerned that China's increasing political influence in Africa may undermine the democratic successes of the past 20 years, which is why this policy has disturbed them.

This competition may arise in regional economic communities and African multilateral organizations such as the African Union (AU). Both China and the US have tried to interact with these groups to shape policy results in ways that align with their respective foreign policy goals. While the United States continues to advocate for democratic governance, free markets, and transparency, China backs authoritarian, development-oriented regimes. As African countries attempt to strike a compromise between these two radically different ideologies, Africa will become a significant battlefield for this ideological struggle.

Despite these disagreements, the majority of Africans continue to support democracy as their system of governance. The majority of Africans, particularly the younger generation, choose democracy over dictatorship, according to studies, suggesting that the US still has a big influence on the continent's political ideology. However, China's increasing diplomatic approach and economic development have the potential to gradually change

political ties in Africa, so this is an area that will need to be actively watched in the years to come.

Escalating U.S.-China Competition for Military Dominance in Africa

As the United States decreased its military footprint and removed troops from Niger, China is boosting its military commitment in Africa. Recently, China offered \$140 million to educate 6,000 military troops on the continent, a strategic move that U.S. officials perceive as driven by China's economic objectives. Analysts predict that military cooperation is becoming a new battleground in the escalating conflict between the U.S. and China in Africa. During a recent China-Africa meeting, Chinese President Xi Jinping committed to the military training effort and invited 500 African officers to China, highlighting China's explicit intention to establish better connections with African security forces (Smith, 2024). China's engagement in African security has risen significantly, involving U.N. peacekeeping operations, cooperative military drills, and officer training programs. Lauren Johnston, an associate professor at the University of Sydney, underlined that this latest vow was China's "most explicit" military cooperation announcement to date. U.S.-Africa Command (AFRICOM) has recognized China's expanding influence, saying that China's goals in Africa are strongly related to its economic ambitions. Currently, China is the continent's second-largest arms exporter, delivering a range of defense items, including missile systems, naval boats, and combat aircraft (KERBOUB Sawsen, 2023). In a significant move, the U.S. recently had to withdraw soldiers from Niger owing to political uncertainty, closing a \$100 million airbase previously used for counter-terrorism in the Sahel. This retreat constitutes a setback, as the U.S. now seeks relationships with other West African countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Benin, to "reset and recalibrate" its regional assets. General Michael Langley of AFRICOM has worked with numerous African states to underscore the U.S. commitment to an "African-led and U.S.-enabled" approach, contrasting with China's top-down influence.

This rivalry reflects deeper, strategic ambitions. China's Global Security Initiative (GSI), unveiled in 2022, contrasts with Western security paradigms by emphasizing non-interference, a principle attractive

to many African leaders. By training 6,000 military people, China seeks to cultivate long-term influence on future African military commanders, boosting its “soft power” and supporting a stable security environment suitable to its economic activities. The U.S., however, frets about China’s aspirations to create another permanent base in Africa. Beijing already has one station in Djibouti and is seeking a West African location, which would position China’s military within reach of the Atlantic, potentially jeopardizing U.S. security concerns (Chin & Bartos, 2024).


Rethinking the U.S. Approach to African Economic Partnerships

In September 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping committed nearly \$29 billion in fresh loans during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. However, the United States continues to mistake this as a sign of China’s economic strength (Abegunrin & Manyeruke, 2019). Over the past few years, the U.S.

has responded to China’s extensive lending schemes by developing its lending frameworks, principally through institutions like the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank (Runde, Bandura, & Murphy, 2019). These institutions have realized efficiency improvements, but this technique is intrinsically wrong. Competing with China on its terms is useless because Chinese banks are better suited structurally to out-lend their American counterparts. Moreover, China’s desire to lend is connected to its economic vulnerability—its growth depends largely on maintaining a positive trade balance, which drives it to give loans to nations that would import Chinese goods and services. Instead of duplicating China’s loan model, Washington should focus on matching its economic partnerships with African needs and U.S. economic capabilities. Programs like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) mutually benefit African exporters and American consumers (KULU, 2019).

Figure 5

Trade in goods between the United States and AGOA beneficiaries



Before U.S. lawmakers can completely accept this approach, they must first acknowledge that China’s reliance on credit is not a sign of strength, but rather indicative of fundamental economic concerns. China’s poor consumer demand, debt-saturated investments, and over-reliance on exports create weaknesses. To overcome this, China’s export credit bureaus aggressively promote overseas lending to generate demand for its goods. Trade tariffs imposed by high-income nations further worsen this dependency. In many situations, China is more reliant on the markets it lends to than those markets are on China.

While observers have highlighted a reduction in Chinese financing to Africa since 2016, China’s Export-Import Bank reflects a different picture. Global lending climbed from \$98 billion in 2016 to \$134 billion by 2023, while domestic loans to Chinese exporters surged from \$34 billion to \$92 billion. This expansion is partly driven by China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange, which aims to invest its vast reserves of U.S. dollars (Brautigam, 2011).

In contrast, U.S. export credit institutions such as the DFC and Export-Import Bank lack financial independence, as their funding depends on periodic congressional appropriations. This makes the U.S.

system less trustworthy. The U.S. doesn't need to compete with China on debt. African countries export huge quantities of raw resources to China, although few can export finished items. The U.S. has the benefit of offering a more balanced economic relationship by boosting trade in completed goods, which helps African economies evolve beyond dependency on commodities. The U.S. economy, powered by consumer demand and balanced domestic and international investment, provides Washington to provide African markets with possibilities for industrialization and sustainable growth. Unlike China, the U.S. can offer export markets for Africa's economic progress, ensuring a sustainable trajectory for low-income countries.


The U.S. already has the infrastructure to make commerce the cornerstone of its African partnerships. AGOA, formed in 2000, fosters African industrialization by offering preferential access to U.S. markets. Expanding AGOA and other trade agreements provides a good alternative to China's loan initiatives. Expanding and internationalizing AGOA, maybe rebranding it as the "International Growth and Opportunity Act," might embrace other low-income regions including Latin America and Southeast Asia. Such a framework would play to U.S.

strengths rather than duplicating China's Belt and Road Initiative.

Additionally, organizing frequent trade agreement discussions could promote diplomatic engagement and ensure the most of these partnerships' benefits. These forums could also act as platforms for initiatives like scholarships or training programs (Runde et al., 2019). Trade agreements also give a more sustainable method as opposed to engaging in a "race to the bottom" over standards. U.S. officials can maintain strong ethical and environmental standards while boosting African markets. Many low-income nations are nearing their debt repayment limits, and the U.S. should learn from past mistakes, such as the debt-driven growth models of the 1960s and '70s, which plagued the world's poorest countries in the following decades (Brautigam, 2011). Rather than competing out of fear of Chinese dominance, Washington should adopt tactics that maximize U.S. capabilities and promote long-term relationships. If China's economy rebalances in the medium term and becomes less reliant on exports, Beijing may cut its loans, potentially leaving the U.S. with debts it never intended to issue. Thus, the U.S. should focus on sustainable, long-term economic strategies that benefit both it and its allies.

Figure 6

US-Africa vs China-Africa trade (US\$ bn)



Source: China Africa Research Initiative

The Withdrawal of US Troops from Niger

On April 19, 2023, the United States withdrew its forces from Niger at the demand of the new military leadership, marking a shift in its influence in the

Sahel region. This withdrawal, initiated by Niger's junta, has substantial implications for U.S. interests, particularly as both Russia and China increase their influence in the region (Kabandula, 2024).

Historically, Niger was a key U.S. ally in the fight against Islamist extremism, with over 1,000 American personnel stationed primarily at Air Base 201 in Agadez, a strategic hub for counter-terrorism operations. However, the July 2023 coup led by the Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) disrupted this relationship, as U.S. law mandated suspending aid to Niger post-coup, including \$200 million in assistance and \$302 million earmarked for infrastructure through the Millennium Challenge Account (Peltier, Schmitt, & Abd Ali, 2024). Despite diplomatic efforts to restore relations, the Nigerien government remained resolute, citing sovereignty concerns and anti-Western sentiment to justify its decision to sever ties with the U.S. Niamey's pivot aligns with a growing anti-French and anti-American sentiment prevalent in francophone Africa, where calls to remove Western influence often resonate with nationalist sentiments. Analysts argue that the actions taken by Niger's leadership may be as much about gaining legitimacy with its population as they are about reducing foreign influence. The CNSP's decisions echo similar expulsions of French forces, highlighting a regional shift towards alternative alliances—primarily with Russia and China, which present themselves as non-interfering, “no-strings-attached” partners.


The US has long had a significant presence in the Sahel, assisting local governments in their efforts to fight terrorism, promote democratic governance, and stimulate economic development. These goals are particularly relevant in neighboring Chad, where U.S. efforts focus on preserving local stability and

preventing the growth of extremist organizations. Recent events, however, suggest that Chad may follow Niger's lead as well, with reports suggesting that the number of Americans stationed at the military airport in N'Djamena may be reducing. This trend, which is fueled by internal factors and rising anti-Western sentiment, may indicate a broader regional realignment away from Western control.

The growing roles of Russia and China in the Sahel area make it much harder for the United States to accomplish its objectives. Russia has progressively increased its military footprint across the continent, mostly through the Wagner Group and the supply of weapons, supporting regimes like those in Mali and Niger, sometimes without the governance standards that come with Western assistance. According to the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, which characterizes Russia's involvement as "a source of instability" that serves Moscow's strategic and economic goals, Russia's activities in Niger are consistent with its larger goal of weakening Western dominance in Africa.

China's extensive economic influence in Africa presents a more significant, long-term challenge for U.S. interests. With bilateral trade exceeding \$282 billion in 2023, China dwarfs Russia's presence and continues to deepen its ties through large-scale infrastructure investments and military partnerships. China's diplomatic engagement and economic strength make it a formidable competitor to U.S. influence in Africa, underscoring the strategic realignment underway on the continent (Smith, 2024).

Figure 7



Source: UNComtrade

Conclusion

As China and the United States escalate their

competition for influence across Africa, the continent has emerged as both a battleground and a

possible beneficiary in this strategic conflict. While China's engagement relies on major infrastructure projects, resource acquisition, and political relationships that match its multipolar worldview, the United States prioritizes sustainable development, governance reforms, and democratic values as counterweights to China's influence. Each state strives to appeal to African nations by presenting itself as the best partner for the continent's future progress and stability. African nations, however, are not just bystanders in this battle. Leaders throughout the continent are utilizing the U.S.-China competition to diversify their economic partnerships, win infrastructure investments, and enhance their bargaining positions

on the global stage. The dual strategy adopted by African states underlines a growing desire for agency, as governments try to profit from the resources, technology, and capital supplied by both giants without compromising national authority. Ultimately, the future trajectory of U.S.-China competition in Africa will depend on the agility and endurance of African leadership in balancing these partnerships. As Africa moves toward becoming a vital player in global economic, environmental, and security issues, the strategic decisions made now will shape the continent's role in a multipolar world order, where African interests are not overshadowed but integral to the balance of global power.

References

- Abegunrin, O., & Manyeruke, C. (2019). China's power in Africa. In Springer eBooks. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21994-9>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Anshan, L. (2021). African studies in China in global context (1950-2020). *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Africanos= Brazilian Journal of African Studies*, 6(12). <https://seer.ufrgs.br/rbea/article/download/113740/66323>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Brautigam, D. (2011). *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*. OUP Oxford.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Chin, J. J., & Bartos, H. (2024). Rethinking US Africa Policy Amid Changing Geopolitical Realities. *Foreign Policy*, 7(2), 114-132. <https://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/52237>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Cohen, H. J. (2020). *US policy toward Africa: Eight Decades of Realpolitik*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Dunford, M. (2021). China's Belt and Road Initiative and its Implications for Global Development. *Acta via Serica*, 6(1), 91-117. <https://doi.org/10.22679/avs.2021.6.1.004>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Edeh, E. C., & Han, Z. B. (2023). The Belt and Road: Understanding the China-Africa proposed co-construction of the Belt and Road initiative. *East Asia*, 40(4), 411-430. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-023-09412-w>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Falola, T. (2003). *The Power of African Cultures* (NED-New edition). Boydell & Brewer. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt1bh2m2w>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Gerits, F. (2017). Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War. *JSTOR*.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Liffe, J. (2017). *Africans: The history of a continent* (Vol. 137): Cambridge University Press.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Jakobson, L. (2009). China's diplomacy toward Africa: drivers and constraints. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 9(3), 403-433. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26159445>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Kabandula, A. (2024). US withdrawal from Niger signals a shift in Western influence in the Sahel. *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/04/us-withdrawal-from-niger-signals-a-shift-in-western-influence-in-the-sahel/>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Kamanzi, O. (2023). A case study: Effective African youth leadership development in an East African community. *University of Arizona Global Campus*.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- KERBOUB, S., & K. N. (2023). The US-China rivalry in Africa. *University of Guelma*. <http://dspace.univ-guelma.dz/jspui/handle/123456789/15581>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Kostecka-Tomaszewska, L., & Krukowska, M. (2021). China's economic statecraft: The role of the Belt and Road initiative. *EUROPEAN RESEARCH STUDIES JOURNAL*, XXIV(Issue 2), 1019-1036. <https://doi.org/10.35808/ersj/2170>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Krpec, O., & Wise, C. (2021). Grand Development Strategy or Simply Grandiose? China's Diffusion of Its Belt & Road Initiative into Central Europe. *New Political Economy*, 27(6), 972-988. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2021.1961218>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Kulu, E. (2019). Effects of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act on exports of member states of West Africa Monetary Zone to the United States. *University of Cape Coast*. <http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/3977>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Kurlantzick, J. (2022). *Beijing's Global Media Offensive: China's Uneven Campaign to Influence Asia and the World*. Oxford University Press.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Martelli, N., & Dijkstra, G. (2022). Drivers and impact of China's Belt and Road Initiative: A case study on Chinese financing of infrastructure development projects in Kenya.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Meibo, H., & Xie, Q. (2013). Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: Development and Prospects. *African East-Asian Affairs*, 74(0). <https://doi.org/10.7552/74-0-65>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Myers, S. L. (2020). China's aggressive diplomacy weakens Xi Jinping's global standing. *The New York Times*.

- <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/world/asia/coronavirus-china-xi-jinping.html>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Ngobeni, T. J., Ndlovu, B., & Hofisi, C. (2023). Examining the dynamics of China–Africa relations: Political economy of colonial relations and crisis of contemporary African diplomacy. In *Political economy of colonial relations and crisis of contemporary African diplomacy* (pp. 255-275). Springer.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Odularu, G. (2020). Strengthening the future of US–Africa trade and business relations. In *Fostering trade in Africa: Trade relations, business opportunities and policy instruments* (pp. 171-181). Springer.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Otele, O. M. (2020). Introduction. China-Africa relations: interdisciplinary question and theoretical perspectives. *The African Review*, 47(2), 267-284.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Otele, O. M. (2023). What explains African perceptions of China as a model of development? *SWP Berlin*.
https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/MTA_working_paper/MTA_WPo8_2023_Otele_Chinas_Model_of_Development.pdf
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Peltier, E., Schmitt, E., & Abd Ali, C. (2024). After Niger coup, US scrambles to keep a vital air base. *International New York Times*.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/06/world/africa/niger-us-air-base.html>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Power, M. (2019). *Geopolitics and development*: Routledge.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Reeves, M. (2014). The broad, toiling masses in all the continents: Anticolonial activists and the Atlantic Charter (Master's thesis). *Western Kentucky University*.
<https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/1341>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Runde, D. F., Bandura, R., & Murphy, O. (2019). Strategic directions for the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). *Center for Strategic and International Studies*.
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategic-directions- united-states-international-development-finance-corporation-dfc>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Scalapino, R. A. (1964). On the trail of Chou En-Lai in Africa. *RAND Corporation*.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2009/RM4061.pdf
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Shinn, D. H. (2019). China–Africa ties in historical context. In *Oxford University Press eBooks* (pp. 61–83).
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198830504.003.0004>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Shinn, D. H., & Eisenman, J. (2012). *China and Africa: A century of engagement*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Singh, A. (2024). Does China pose a threat? Examining the US case for a new Cold War. *University of Manitoba*. <http://hdl.handle.net/1993/37937>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Smith, C. (2024). Assessing the efficacy of US policy in the Sahel: A multifaceted approach.
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)
- Zhu, Y., & Gao, W. (2024). The Sahel on the edge of the abyss? Why U.S. counterterrorism engagement has failed to achieve its goal? *Frontiers in Political Science*, 6. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2024.1466715>
[Google Scholar](#) [Worldcat](#) [Fulltext](#)