

Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan (1998-2015)



Vol. I, No. 1 (2016)

Pages: 74 – 84

DOI: 10.31703/gpr.2016(1-1).08

p- ISSN: 2521-2982

e-ISSN: 2707-4587

ISSN-L: 2521-2982

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Abstract

Pakistan remained under military domination for about 32 years (1958-1971, 1977-1988 and 1999 to 2008). The perpetual influence of military overshadowed the civilian in one way or the other. To analyze civil-military nexus accurately, it is necessary to assess how both civil and military leaders handle policy discrepancies between them. The entire concept of the overall civil-military nexus is broadly based on the fact of how to assure civil control over the military. During Musharraf's regime, various nonmilitary practices with the vested interest of the military as a priority encouraged the military greatly while the civilians were kept in the background. But in spite of such defiance towards the army, a sound political leadership could not be brought forward to stand against military power and to keep them confined to their barracks. The civilian power that has governed the country encompasses two families' monopoly i.e. the Bhutto and Sharif.

Key Words: Civilian, Military, Relations, Dictatorship, Politics, Terrorism, Pakistan.

Objectives of the Study

The main objectives of the study are:

1. To analyze civil military relations in Pakistan.
2. To go through the reasons for military intervention in Pakistani politics.
3. Effects of military involvement and possibilities of a healthy democratic system in Pakistan.

Literature Review

Cohen (1998) analyses the inclination of civil, military relation in Pakistan in 2011, he urges that the role of the army, although, receded, but not minimized and the army remains as the undisputed power having its deep roots in almost every government of the country that got established during the various phases.

Eliot A Cohen Author Links Open the author, workshop: What relation does exist between civilians, the security overall and the public as a whole and the military established a segregated armed frame to defend the society. This question finds its apt reply difficulty in various countries keeping in mind the deep influence of historical, emotional and conventional background. It depends upon the role of the military as a state institution in a particular country, the subservience of the military to the civilians, government and leadership as directed by the law and constitutional framework.

Haqqani (2010) describes Pakistan, among USA allies as having an ambiguous state of neither as a friend nor foe. Working along with the US with full support Pak army strengthened its position both outside and inside the country which left a deep impact on the already fragile political setup of the country.

Huntington (1995) analyses and says that there is a great difference between the civilian and military worlds. He says that these both worlds could coexist without risking and jeopardizing the liberal democracy, he suggests that for maintaining order the civilian authorities needed to frame a way of directing the military

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without letting it get into the autonomous character and organization or the prerogative of the military world thus keep the politics at bay.

Huntington and Janowitz suggest that for better relations to be maintained the civilian power must build up a paramilitary force for tackling any internal disturbance. This paramilitary force must be at the beck and call of the political world. The army must be kept away from the negative political and social effects of the civilian world.

Khan (2005) brings another vital issue regarding the military zeal for their intrusion in the political setup of the country. It is the sense of superiority complex that is infused into the army officers' minds who look at politicians & civilians as incapable and inferior. However, the military role keeps on varying from disdainful politics to adhering to it. There are various sectors that have been affected by the military in one way or another.

Kukreja (1991) says the blemishes of electoral procedure cause a perpetual contraction and the unrepresentativeness of self-perpetuating elite has made the military overtake the rule of the country after a decade, which speaks in volumes the inability of the politician with their shallow insight and self-centeredness which paved the way for the army to overthrow civilian government.

Myrdal (1968) makes a fair analysis of the party led by an army from the early stage of the country's inception. He discussed the strife for power both a moral as well as ideological bases. A government that tries to create national cohesion and consolidation along with national progress is prone to confront inescapable complications. Pakistan lacks political identity and national allegiance. The inequality based on social and economic growth has created gaps among the public. But if contrived Pakistan can achieve better living standards, diminish inequalities, reduce population ratio and obtain the cooperation and participation of the people, Pakistan can still realize the dream of a great section of its people.

Niaz (2009) declare that the incompetence of politician eased the way for a military intrusion in the political arena of the country. Whenever Pakistan slides towards bankruptcy theocracy and state future military assistance were sought, but it generally resulted in the military take over. Furthermore, the army's help in natural disaster management provided them to taste the flavor of political power they got accustomed to and their presence or unnecessary intervention became a matter of routine thus the political power and institutional development tumbled down under the indomitable and formidable power of the army.

Oldenburg (2010) compares the democratic system of India and Pakistan and points out the factors that made Indian democracy stronger than Pakistan. According to him in many third world countries, the governance system is an arena with various participants, which he calls constitutive authorities, which is a combination of civil bureaucracy, military power publicly elected representatives, religious or clergy and other related parties. The tug of war usually takes place among them. The common belief boasted by the army is there being the only protectors of Pakistan.

Rashid (2008) declares Pakistan as a Hobbesian country and says that the root cause of its instability lies in its government's foolishly indiscreet policies. In spite of having a powerful army nuclear weapon, geostrategic importance. Pakistan remains unable to maintain a solid political system inside where it could play a vital role in uplifting public lives by meeting their needs. Its weak economy, its illiterate population, unemployed youth and above all a military that supports the Taliban in Afghanistan while consistently fight them in Pakistan.

Rizvi declares Pakistan as a Praetorian state where the military has gained credentials to have their dominance over the fundamentals of political infrastructure and the process of the country. Its role slowly encompassed the area where it emerged as an important stakeholder in the formation of the decision particularly in defense and security matters. He asserts the Praetorian nature of the military with its external tussles and constrained relations with India post-Bangladesh insecurity and Afghanistan war were such factors that made the indulgence of military process indispensable in the country's political setup.

Shah (2014) has drawn a vivid description that projects a noticeable involvement of the army in Pakistan politics since its inception. Shah clearly unfolds the permeable complicity between the country's civilian and military spheres. Apart from supplying a marvelous study of the relation between Pakistan military and civilian. Shah makes vital and more general scholarly addition, he elucidates that the security challenges overpower the political infrastructure of the country that made the military intervention indispensable.

Siddiqi (2017) put forward the concept of Milbus (military capital) as a different military investment in various sectors be it (FF, SF, BF, AWT) has been working for the personal vested interest of senior military officers. The expenses of Milbus have thrown Pakistan into the abyss of uncertainty and its future bleak.

Civil-Military Relations in the Context of Internal Politics

Within a year after independence, Pakistan fell prey to leadership which lacked vision and political insight that caused many issues sprung, which created a lot of disturbance in internal as well as external policies of the state. The leadership after the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah remained at the mercy of division and confusion. That unsettled scenario of political structure encouraged military and intelligence apparatus to surface and declared themselves as the real protectors of the country (Siddiqui, 2006, p. 621). While in India under the leadership of Jawahar Lal Nehru, he gave strength to the political infrastructure of the country and had succeeded in establishing a cemented political system in his country (Ahmad, 2013). The fact behind the prosperity and stability of India is the result of strengthening the political system (Bhimaya, 1997).

Since the inception of Pakistan, national assembly as pointed out by Gunnar Myrdal (1968) is old wine in a new bottle because Pakistan's leaders have the old mindset with the old system that finds itself in failures on every stage. The arbitrary suspension of parliamentary government, both at the center and various times in the provinces. Furthermore; for curbing riots military rule got imposed to prevent public agitation.

The resulting signs of political fragile stability and vanishing discipline surged that gave birth to further economic and political turmoil. The inept politician with their immature vision (Paul, 2014, p. 45) brought a complete cessation to politics that might have worked for the amelioration of the public and the state overall.

The prevalence of martial law covered almost half of Pakistan's existence since it got independence. "The military intervenes in the politics when all other institutions confronting war against each other, they called upon the military to handle the situation" (Kukreja, 1991). But on the other hand, some scholars have the opinion that the monstrosity of military rule devoured most of the country's vision for prosperity and progress. Such situations made the constitution null and void while the emergency situation became routine in the country that further hurled down the country into the abyss of uncertainty (Saddiqi, 2011).

Mehdi (2005) has rightly pointed out that Pakistan's constitutional history is marked with an ambiguous distinction with three permanent and five provisional constitutions. Pakistan's existence is woven around executive orders, ordinance, regulations and adhocism. The core reason behind such a vile process is the avarice for power and the lack of enlightened visionary leaders.

A vivid tussle between executive and legislature can be seen, consequently; the executive has always a wielding upper hand. The executive makes a decision on party forum which is subsequently translated into the mainstream law by legislative procedure and adopted and implemented rigidly and forcibly by bureaucracy. The dominance of the extra-parliamentary institution is taken by politicians as essential fabric needed for political order streamlined by these institutions frequently power pre dominance outside the legislature. Those in power practice legal and moral authority. It is surprising, but historically authentic to fill the emptiness almost all four military governments held so called election in 1962-1970-1985-2002 (Siddiqi, 2007, p. 65).

It is quite obvious that the institution of leadership in Pakistan has remained weakened and dependent right from top to bottom. The degraded status of Pakistan owes a lot to the crisis of genuine leadership. The self centered and greed has been the deadliest element that has brought down the standard and morale

of Pakistani politicians. Personal vested interest gives preference over the national cause (Rehman, 2011, p. 196).

According to Rehman (2011), a nation recompensates the follies of its leadership in the shape of miseries and backwardness in almost all spheres of life be it political, social or economic. The irony is that Pakistan is a victim of many harassing issues about which Pakistani leaders are unconscious and unaware of what is to think about their solution and address.

Pakistan could be compared to Hobbes where almost all political and provincial groups are found in disputing state against one another. There generally occurred a constant and relentless tug of war for grabbing power. "The leaders were found with an inclination of self-centeredness and narcissisms" (Taj & Zia, 2015, p. 112). They brought about their families, their comforts and luxuries thinking little for their country Pakistan (Sayeed, 1959).

Genuine leadership begins from social stratum and from bottom to top, where the issues of common people are understood, but in Pakistan, the case is totally reversed. There is complete chaos regarding leadership (Shah, 2014, p. 252). Zardari remained reportedly a self-proclaimed leader with no actual political vision that he could utilize for the progress of the country. The politics of Pakistan is based on family lineage where son replaces father, a dynasty based politics a rule of succession as in old times of kings and monarchs.

Pakistani politics revolves around influential and rich while the benefits public representatives are kept at the backseat of the political vehicle of the country (Taj & Zia, 2015, p. 108). Ideologies are sacrificed on the altar of personality cult while blind devotion and political frenzy with no political vision or motives behind this madness. The naive and simple public is emotionally exploited by showing them green fields and when such politicians succeeded, they never turn back to those people.

Another catastrophic element of political instability is the illiteracy and political inexperience that makes hurdles in the way of political institutionalization. Simple masses are exploited for political favor by raising issues of the caste system, pluralistic society and other such deceptive tactics are fully utilized, especially in times of elections to win public favor. People are incited on language, cultural and sectarian levels just to use them by politicians for their personal motives. "Democracy in Pakistan is not mature and ripe" (Lieven, 2011, p. 209). It needed someone with political vision who could put back the train of democracy if it ever derailed, but Pakistan has been deprived of such visionary politicians who could bring it to political maturity. The reverberation of military intervention has been another menace that has been victimized by this country from the very time of its independence.

The bleak peruses of the country's history in the initial decade with countless political upheavals, the subsequent dismissal of governments, very trivial issues in the form and framework of the country. The period from 1951 to 1958 was an example of political stability or can be declared as Augean stable in the history of Pakistan. It was an output of the efforts of Pakistan leaders at that time, which can rarely be found afterward. It is also a bitter fact that there were two governors-general and seven prime ministers during this period that succeeded one another unconstitutionally (Paul, 2014, p. 49).

The death of Liaqat Ali Khan gave way to military intervention and a shift of power to the bureaucracy. The nation got entangled into the web of conspiracies and intrigues. Both Sikandar Mirza and Ghulam Muhammad were from bureaucratic class (Lamb, 1991, p. 11). They were the main characters who paved the way for military ascendancy in the politics of the country (Rizvi, 2004, p. 95). Ayub Khan likewise missed no opportunity in exploiting the weak and the incapable politics of the time. When an attempt to rescuing the power of the governor-general Ghulam Muhammad was made; he immediately took prompt action by dissolving the constituent assembly, an abominable action that was legalized by the then Chief Justice Munir (McGrath, 1997). Such indiscreet action tarnished the struggles for political stability and dragged the country into the quagmire of greed from both military and bureaucracy (Ahmad, 2013).

The military intervention was encouraged by such unconstitutional and no legal action which put the incompetent politicians at backdrop. A clear example of military dominance could be seen that within a

period of two years i-e from 1956 to 1958 there had been six prime ministers. The confused and chaotic scenario of the political infrastructure of the country and the visible fiasco of parliamentary government boosted the misadventures of military intervention in the politics of the country because the people needed control rather than democracy (Jalal, 1995, p. 56).

During the government of Sikandar Mirza, the presidency remained the hub of conspiracies, intrigues and machination while the resultant martial law turned the situation in the worst form of government. The first catastrophe in Pakistan history occurred when Ayub Khan extradited Sikandar Mirza to England, took over the government and to shield and strengthen his hold. He started showing various facades like Basic Democracy and quasi election to prolong his rule. Making his rule unbearable for the masses until they rose against him in the shape of political seething. He handed over the government to another dictator Commander in Chief Yahya Khan, who brought great devastation to Pakistan in the shape of the disintegration of the country.

During the reign of Ayub Khan, he held his grip very adroitly by his ostentatious acts of introducing B.D (Basic Democracy) which brought the country to the threshold of corruption and chaos. He declared the 1956 constitution null and void and introduced the 1962 constitution. This indiscreet act prophesized the possibility that it was the army who would only be able to protect and drag the country from any sort of disconcerting situation, which civil government unable to do.

Such tactful strategies enabled Ayub Khan to rule the country till 1969 when public rose against him there were countrywide political agitations against him prominently led by Z.A Bhutto and Ayub Khan handed over the government to Yahya Khan. A simultaneous and forceful political uprising started against him in both wings of Pakistan (Mujeeb Ur Rehman in Eastern Pakistan) his government came to complete cessation.

In such a topsy-turvy situation India took advantage and attacked Pakistan. Being internally at tension and not ready for the sudden attack Pakistan succumbed to another disastrous accident of disintegration in the shape of another state Bangladesh. The existence of Bangladesh got possible because of the intrigues and conspiracy of both East wing and India (Haqqani, 2010, p. 63). Thus, because of indiscreet decisions of Pakistan's leaders and the unjustifiable craze for power caused the inception of Bangladesh right from the womb of fragile Pakistan. Pakistan's political history is full of such heart-wrenching incidents. "The 70 years existence of Pakistan on motherland is a story told of political tussles and quick succession that left the country hollow and miserable" (Rabbani, 2013, p11).

Another tragedy that blotched the country's political history was "the dethroning of Z.A Bhutto by Zia Ul Haq and his consequential execution" (Siddiqi, 2016, p. 71). Thus the democratically elected prime minister was hanged and another military regime started that further dragged the country into the military monstrous jaw that had to devour the country and its public. Zia Ul Haq introduced Shora to the parliament and new experiences were observed while the political forces of the country remained silent spectators or showed their consents over what the military wanted to do.

The regime of Zia Ul Haq was challenged when Benazir had been returned to the country and built up the political status by standing against Zia. Elections were held and Benazir won overwhelmingly thus getting herself elected or the prime minister of the country. Thus, once again the country came into the lap of the public representative elected by the public itself. The 1988 plane crash gave another turn to the politics of the country. Ghulam Ishaq Khan applied 52/2(B) of the constitution on August 1990 and toppled down the government of Benazir Bhutto. "Allegations of corruption publicized in the media by the ISI against Benazir Bhutto because she had lost the confidence of the army" (Shah, 2014, p. 171).

Thus the nation once again had to face bleakness and despondency. The recurring political wrangling weakened the country and created an air of confusion, chaos and utter disappointment for the nation. Such kinds of slew of challenge put the integrity of Pakistan at stake and its existence threatened, the question that can be posed from political parties at present time is the survival of Pakistan. Such internal damaging acts made Pakistan's status dubious in the comity of nations.

None of the political government came up to the expectation of the public, a public that has been an aspirant for a government, that could fulfill their needs, most of which were related to their basic needs. The public had been hoodwinked by almost every government (Lodhi, 2011, p. 169). The dreams that they usually attached with every political government shattered because of the incompetence and self centeredness of the politicians who showed not even an idea of consciousness to drag the miserable public out of their problem and to fulfill their dreams in the least possible way.

The posterity will never give such consciousness to politicians and leaders who did nothing but fill their banks and however the exchequer like vultures. Pakistan will prosper if its leaders preferred national interest upon individual and personal vested interests. Leaders should stop presenting their political party's motives or doing favoritism for a number of people, they should rather have nation based spirit for the development, prosperity and welfare of the nation as whole (Taj & Zia, 2015, p. 103). Their approach should be macroscopic rather than microscopic. Sincerity, love and sympathetic understanding of the public must be the highest priority of Pakistan political leaders (Lieven, 2011, p. 195).

Kargil Incident and Civil-Military Relations

During the winter absence of Indian troops, that was sometime around mid-November 1998, four Pakistani generals had planned to inhabit the territory in Dras Kargil, those included Aziz Khan, Mahmood Ahmad, and Shahid Aziz led by Musharraf (Lavoy & Lavoy, 2009). Arrangements continued in secret by keeping the plan undisclosed from additional military commanders. At some point in December 1998, Musharraf approached the matter with Sharif in an informal way but Sharif denied that as a Prime Minister of Pakistan he was not taken in to confidence regarding Kargil. While the army failed in presenting inclusive scrutiny of the extent of the operation and also its probable conclusion. Musharraf along with the other three generals saw the activity of the Indian-controlled region as a means of providing an incentive to the Kashmiri freedom movement.

The plan as visualized by the Pakistani military leadership: the political aim underpinning the operation was to seek a just and permanent solution to the Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir. However, "the military aim that led the political aim was to create a military threat that could be viewed as capable of leading to a military solution, the main aim of this operation was to capture strategic peaks and to cut off Indian army's supply route to Siachin (Shah, 2014,p. 180). The operational plan envisaged India amassing troops at the Line of Control to deal with the threat at Kargil, resulting in a vacuum in their rear areas" (Haqqani, 2010, p. 226).

Slight consideration was paid in the plan to international response and also the prospect of India's deployment of dissimilar battlefield diplomacy. Pakistan's military incursion into Kargil was not a small matter in India's perspective, Pakistani forces occupied "mountain tops overlooking the Kargil highway" and was threatening to weaken Indian control over a significant part of Kashmir. Moreover, it also desecrated the spirit of the peace progression that Sharif and Vajpayee had agreed upon barely a few months ago and amounted to treachery on Pakistan's part. India acknowledged hold up from, amongst others the United States and China and also accumulated a most important diplomatic campaign. The international community approximately collectively demanded Pakistan's withdrawal from Kargil. Musharraf and his three fellow generals had handled to unite the international community against Pakistan as an alternative of helping focus on the Kashmiri freedom fight back.

Pakistan struggled to blame Kashmiri militants, the mujahideen for the invasions and denied that the military operation in Kargil concerned government troops. A tape-recorded conversation linking Musharraf and the Pakistan army's Chief of General Staff was released by India, Lieutenant General Aziz Khan had left no uncertainty about Pakistan's military presence in Kargil. The conversation between Musharraf and Aziz Khan took place while Musharraf was in Beijing and Aziz Khan at army headquarters in Rawalpindi (Haqqani, 2010, p. 227).

Unable to contradict Pakistan's role any longer and faced with the vision of India defeating Pakistan militarily for the first time under civilian rule, Sharif ongoing looking for the resolution of a face-saving issue. India presented Sharif a probability to distance himself from actions in Kargil by suggesting that the Pakistani army had undertaken the operation without political sanctions (Qadir, 2002, p. 24).

Sharif was unwilling to demonstrate the world that he did not manage the associations of Pakistan as prime minister did not want to take on the military leadership publicly. Paradoxically, these were the equivalent fears that had prohibited Bhutto from going public over her differences with the generals during both her terms. Similar to Bhutto for pretending to go along with out-of-control generals Sharif paid a heavy price. He vanished the power that he tried to hold on to and also the credibility that might have survived had he exposed Musharraf's strategic miscalculation once the world turned against Pakistan during the Kargil crisis.

Thus the Pak army withdrew and made a retreat from LOC. The blame ground had started and Nawaz openly occurred army of the aggression & trespassing. Nawaz was fully determined to replace COAS Musharraf. As retaliation Musharraf after his visit from Sri Lanka took control of the country (Nawaz, 2008). Thus such incidents led a coup and detention of Nawaz Sharif thus started an era of the military regime and inhibited the duty of the army in the internal security system. This campaign encompassed military operations against terrorism sectarian & ethnic violence and other connected crimes. During the Musharraf regime, there had launched various military operations containing and confronting diversified sinister activities like terrorism religious & ethnic extremism. These operations were supposed to continue for an unlimited period. According to Lavoy "the Pakistani literature on Kargil is, even more, one-sided. For a long time, there had been no official Pakistani government or military account of what took place on Kargil heights. In part because the story of how Pakistani troops occupied and then withdrew from this territory quickly became intertwined with the civil-military dispute between former Nawaz Sharif and former president Musharraf, who during the Kargil affairs was Sharif's army chief" (Lavoy & Lavoy, 2009). According to Paul, "the failure of Pakistan at Kargil created a major political backlash. Sharif's relationship with General Musharraf deteriorated dramatically" (Paul, 2014, p. 66; Talbot, 2012, p. 167). The main reason for this imbalance in civil-military relation is because of the military wield's a veto and suppress and control the political government's veto (Paul, 2014, p. 79). Thus civilian life is deeply penetrated by the military.

War on Terror and Musharraf

Ayub Khan's bargaining for larger economic and military aid became the norm for his successors. In 1979 after Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, Zia Ul Haq similarly drove a hard bargain when in Afghanistan, U.S sought to expend anti-communist insurgency. Musharraf was also fortunate enough to get full recognition of his government after the 9/11 attacks on the United States. His government received robust acknowledgment from the USA when he extended his full support for its war on terror (Perlez, 2008). Pakistan became the frontline country in this adventure. Musharraf assured the USA of his full support this resulted in conflicts from political institutions.

The providence of Pakistan its airfields to and its alliances with the United States was deemed mostly in negative. It is strange that public opinion went into supporting the Taliban especially from the urban area of Pakistan while many people declared Osama bin Laden as a freedom fighter as compared to terrorists while support for the USA was marginalized. Many of the people are of the opinion that the attack on the USA was clearly an act of terrorism. Pakistan not only brought booming economic aid, but it elevated the image of Pakistan in the world community. Musharraf also followed Ayub Khan in seeking the right price for cooperation in the war.

American policy towards Pakistan is dwindling and has always been in a state oscillating. The American think tank perceived that pressure on Pakistan for killing or capturing Al Qaeda warlords and leaders thus putting an end to the war on terrorism as a win. Although Pakistan remained supportive towards America in its war against terrorism yet their nexus remained dubious. America supported every

military ruler in Pakistan because it is easy for America to influence one person easily as compare to the whole parliament that is why there is always an imbalance in civil-military relations regarding Pakistan's stand on the international front. This imbalance leads to political chaos within the country.

Musharraf Trial

Most analyses hurriedly praise General Kayani for the ease of change. Pakistanis were made to consider that the army chief was very kind in not imposing military rule despite the inefficiencies of the political governments. But why do we imagine that a military general is always in a hurry to take over power, especially if he can get things done to his taste without going to the forefront? Over the past couple of decades, the civilians had probably understood the military's threshold a bit better. They had understood that generals intervened only when the interests of the high command and the officer cadre, in general, were violated. The stories of action became imperative due to national interests were then spun around the action.

The civilian leadership had understood what buttons not to press that would annoy the generals. What happened with Musharraf was part of this new reality. If politicians are made accountable under the constitution of Pakistan then what about the military generals and what about the justice institution. In Musharraf's case, the civilian government would try to leave the ball in the Supreme Court's court and in all probability go through the motions of a trial. A big question is 'Will the judges use their newly-acquired moral courage to take the case to its natural wrapping up?' to which there were no understandable answers. The court's recent decision to provide a safe exit to the Frontier Corps IG in the 'missing persons' case might be an indicator of how it will proceed in this one. In addition, another case is the fate of the Asghar Khan pointer that the muck will sooner or later get thrown at the politicians and the two generals involved in it will only have to face the mortification of keeping silent.

"On 29th May the ISI reportedly abducted tortured and brutally murdered Saleem Shehzad a journalist just after one day when he exposed links between Al Qaeda and Navy personnel involved in a deadly attack on a naval base in Karachi" (Shah, 2014, p. 229). If wishes were horses, one would like the aforementioned trials to be conducted seriously. On the other hand, it does not seem that a range of stakeholders were prepared to go the whole hog. But this also does not mean that the former dictator should feel smug and not be pleased about the kindness of the new era in which appearances have to be kept. It would provide him better not to open his mouth too often and think that not getting penalized can be used as a personal political dividend. This time a retired army general is risking things for everyone not the civilians.

Memogate and Civil-military relations

Since there have been conflicting relations between Pakistan's army, Bhutto's PPP government from 2008 to 2013 strived to underestimate the Pakistan army along with the inter-services intelligence several times. First, it alleged the Pakistan army for the grant of U.S 7 Billion aid to Pakistan, which according to PPP was not rightly utilized by the army. Secondly, in May 2011 when the USA raided, which resulted in Osama Bin Ladin's assassination PPP allegedly sent a treasonous letter to the USA to help it against the military take over. PPP was ready to compromise on Pakistan's nuclear program and its national security. The conspiracy against the country was smelted and the Supreme Court formed a judicial commission that was halted by PPP's then-ambassador to the USA Hussain Haqqani. The suspect has managed to flee from the country with the help of the leadership. The ex-prime minister Yousaf Raza Galani further condemned establishment in the parliament on 23rd Dec, 2011. Civil-military relations reached at the apex when Prime minister condemned the unconstitutional and illegal act of the armed forces for filing affidavits on the memo issue in the Supreme Court and he said that "his government would not tolerate a state within a state" (Shah, 2014, p. 230). On the other hand, armed forces replied in a very harsh manner and said the premier's remarks could have grievous consequences.

Dharna and Civil-Military Stances

Pakistan's knowledge put forward that the military consistently gets pleasure from superiority in civil-military relations the reason is that the country developed as a security state from the early on years of independence due to peripheral security threats and the fear of internal collapse (Rizvi, 2013, p. 267). American military and economic assistance lend a hand to modernize the military, thereby put emphasis on Pakistan's institutional disparity. The elongated years of direct and indirect military rule, the frail and divided political leadership in the post-military withdrawal period and the Afghanistan war all issues boosted the institution's image. The military contributes the most decisive input in the making of foreign policy and security choices. It enjoys a near-monopoly on Pakistan's nuclear pregame.

When Nawaz Sharif assumed power in June 2013 he appeared to command the political system (Daily Times, 2015). Sharif's government has been weakened since the beginning of the term in June 2013 by the Military believed some experts (Pildat, 2017). The first of such efforts was the PTI dharna in 2014. However, he gradually lost ground to the military in 2014-15. The balance of civil-military relations began to shift away from Nawaz Sharif with the PTI dharna (*The Express Tribune, November 16th, 2015*). The PML-N's top leadership made up its mind to work closely with the military to protect itself from the opposition onslaught. In a quick stroke, a political storm was created (dharneas) by Imran Khan's PTI and Tahirul Qadri. One after the other each of Nawaz's desires dwindled. The military was back into an invisible power (The Nation, 2016). Imran Khan operationalized agitation politics with the effect that he, Qadri and the prime minister rushed to the military general headquarters on August 28, 2014, to save their skins. Herein lie the causes and consequences of the ruptured civil-military relations after the PTI's dharna (Daily Times, August 21, 2015). The whole world watched this embarrassing saga while Pakistan could not host the Chinese President due to a visit in September 2014 where CPEC agreements would have been signed (Pildat, 2017).

The military is convinced that every civilian government is weak. While there are no two views about the requirements for each political party and resultant government to be efficient and honest, it is not the job of the Military to sit in judgment of elected governments. Worldwide even in developing democracies, the challenges of governance are overcome through the sustenance of the system in which citizens vote governments in and out (Pildat, 2017). The indecisiveness of the Sharif government in countering religious extremism and terrorism adversely affected its capacity to pursue these issues with firmness and clarity. The insistence on a dialogue with the TTP when the group did not give any indication of wanting direct contact with the government showed poor handling of the dialogue option. Surrounded by TTP sympathizers. Nawaz Sharif delayed the military action, giving enough time to the group's leadership to relocate. It was the military that unilaterally decided to launch the security operation in North Waziristan on June 15, 2014 (Javaid, 2016).

The Sharif government was left with no option but to endorse the decision. The military's recent frustrations are mainly due to the non-availability of the required civilian support in Sindh, Punjab and at the federal level for consistent implementation of the NAP and the control of corruption in the government, funding of terrorist groups and madrasa reforms. The civilian leadership is not likely to adopt a forthright approach to these issues as its support base overlaps with those engaged in these activities. Civil-military relations will continue to move on an uneven path (Shah, 2014). The management of this relationship will be a delicate balancing act for all stakeholders. Pakistan faces acute internal and external security challenges. Neither the civilians nor the military alone can deal with them. They will have to work together, showing restraint towards the peculiar behavior patterns of each side. A functional civilian order is required for ensuring internal and external security (*The Express Tribune, November 16th, 2015*).

National Action Plan

Many analysts observed that the civil-military relations took a new bonding following the tragic incident of

Peshawar on December 16, 2014, this gore incident paved the way for the formation of a national action plan. There were found enhanced coordination by the PML(N) supporting fully the army in the formation of military courts.

This decision was made more authentic when a statement issued from the prime minister's office dully confirmed that civil-military leaderships are on the same page. It was further solidified when a consensus was expressed in the formation of military courts. Army power overreached not only in security policymaking, it boosted the image of the army at the international level crediting the COAS's profile.

Some political analysts observed that the growing role of military ushered its interference in areas of civilian government where it should not have been as demanded by the army's ethical codes. There were many issues that needed prompt attention both from the military as well as from the civilian government. The foremost among them was the repatriation of the displaced people during the Zar-e-Azb operation. The federal government started working on fundraising (PILDAT, 2015).

However, the cat was out of the bag when a statement was issued by the chief of the armed forces about the negligence of the civilian government in the implementation of the national action plan (NAP). Viewing the complaints of the military, the civilian government has earnestly made NAP functioning. Nonetheless, apart from other differences between PML (N) government and the establishment, some elements PML (N) is in a conspiracy campaign against the establishment, neutralizing and contracting the prime minister's elbow greasing to improve this relation (Express Tribune, August 22, 2016).

The Role of CMR in Decision Making Regarding Nuclear Technology

The issue of nuclear technology has proven the decision that has been taken by both civil and military leaders unanimously showing undeterred agreement, which can be regarded as the great triumph of CMR. Though there may be differences in various planning and decided between civil and military systems, yet there is enough evidence showing no difference of opinion and an utter agreement relating to Pakistan's nuclear program.

It is a program commenced by the civilian prime minister, operated by prominent civilian scientists and preserved and protected by the Pakistan armed forces while last but not the least, protected by an article of faith for each coming governments, be it military or civilian. This unity and steadfastness in the matter of nuclear program are quite exemplary on both national as well as international level. Differences are buried but no comprise on the nuclear program. It is dealt with as a matter of faith and integrity. There has been individual mistrust, citing the example of Memo gate and Mehran gate, which resulted in creating fuss and hype on media, yet in spite of these contradictions, the nation has been showing exceptional unity and faith while showing solidarity on the nuclear program.

Yet keeping a balance between these institutes proved a herculean task for both. But it is worth mentioning here that as far as the nuclear program in the country is concerned, there can be no comprise on this from either side, be it civilian power or military institute. It is a matter of national importance and survival, and the whole nation should stand united (Sayeed, 2010).

Conclusion

In a nutshell, we can easily analyze that strong and mutually corresponding civil-military relations should be the top priority for a developed, secure and economically developed Pakistan. Without sound civil-military relation, we can not imagine our country having a good name in the international committee. Many things need to be clarified many relations with other countries need to be analyzed and countless personal interests have to be buried just for the sake of the country. Pakistan has the potential to become a modern stable state if serious reforms are taken. Sincere leadership with visionary political insight and a harmonious understanding can drag Pakistan back from the brink of crisis.

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